

7. The way of life and the formation of A. Yakovliv as a lawyer and historian of law

7.1 Formation of legal views of A. Yakovliv

A. Yakovliv belonged to the generation of Ukrainian lawyers who met the events of 1917 with mature people who had national-democratic views and wanted to use their knowledge and work to establish an independent, democratic, national Ukrainian state. The proclamation of Ukraine's independence contributed to the study of public and scientific activities of Ukrainian lawyers who lived outside Ukraine.

A.I. Yakovliv was born on November 28 (December 11), 1872 in the town of Chyhyryn, Kyiv province, in the family of the provincial secretary Ivan Yukhymovych Yakovliv. The boy's mother (the second wife of a 44-year-old father), Maria Prokhorovna, was 19 at the time. A large family lived in their house on Dvoryanska Street [322, p. 4].

After primary school in Cherkasy (1886–1890), A. Yakovliv studied at the Kyiv Theological Seminary (1890–1894), which he graduated with a first-degree diploma. During 1894–1898 A. Yakovliv worked as a teacher in Cherkasy. From 1898 to 1902 he studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Dorpat (Tartu). The young man became interested in the history of Ukrainian, Western Russian and Western European law, and during his internship (1901–1902) he diligently studied documents of the Warsaw Main Archives, the Warsaw State Chamber, and the Warsaw Libraries. The result of the search was the scientific work "Cherkasy Economic Castle and County in the XV-XVII centuries.", Which was prepared under the guidance of Professor (later Academician) M. Dyakonov (author of the well-known at the time "Essays on the social and state system of ancient Russia") [323, p. 3]. Work on the dissertation gave A. Yakovliv the opportunity to study archival documents relating not only to Cherkasy Castle, "but also to its near and far neighborhoods, including the neighborhood of Chyhyryn and the history of its founding" [324, p. 44]. In 1901–1902 he was forced to work on the construction of the Warsaw-Kalisz railway [325, p. 203].

The end of the XIX - first years of the XX century. were a period of intensification of the Ukrainian national movement. During this period, national-political organizations were created, so it is natural that the idea of a purely national union arose among Tartu Ukrainian students. Its founders were F. Matushevsky and A. Yakovliv, who were acquainted in Ukraine. To attract the attention of Ukrainian students, they spoke only Ukrainian. At the end of 1889, the Dorpat Ukrainian Student Community was established. F. Matushevsky, A. Yakovliv, K.-F. Redlich and S. Macri signed the charter of the community. According to him, its members could be students of the University of Tartu - Ukrainians by origin or beliefs who shared the idea of independence of the Ukrainian nation and culture. The political program of the community demanded constitutional freedoms in Russia, autonomy of Ukraine within its national territory, the right of Ukrainians to education, literature and the press in their native language. The charter also required strict secrecy from its members, as the Ukrainian community, like most Tartu student national organizations, was an illegal association. F. Matushevsky was elected chairman of the council, A. Yakovliv was elected deputy, V. Kozlovsky was elected secretary, and S. Macri was elected treasurer [326, p. 77-78]. At the beginning, the Student Community met every Saturday in the apartment rented by F. Matushevsky and A. Yakovliv, on the street. Tehelfer, or other members. Abstracts or reports on the problems of Ukrainian life, culture, and ideological issues were read at the meetings. At the end of February, according to tradition, the community celebrated Taras Shevchenko's Day. The first anniversary was organized at the end of February 1899 in an apartment on Tehelferskaya, where A. Yakovliv delivered an essay on "Cultural and educational movement in Galicia and Bukovina" [327, p. 43]. In 1900, in the days of Taras Shevchenko, L. Ukrainka took part in a visit to M. Kosach's brother, who studied at the University of Tartu. Members of the community took part in student performances in 1899–1902 in Tartu [326, p. 78].

From the 15th to the 27th of August, 1902, the XII Archaeological Congress took place in Kharkiv, in which A. Yakovliv took part. He published an article in the Don region "and two reports:" Excavation of the mound in the village. Cattle Bakhmut

district of Ekaterinoslav province in August 1900. " and "A few words about accidental archaeological finds in the construction of railways." During the construction of the railway on the banks of the Chir River (a right tributary of the Don), a burial ground and silicon tools from the Neolithic-Eneolithic period were found. In the works of A. Yakovliv described the results of excavations [328].

The gifted and talented student was invited to stay at the Department of History and Law after graduation to prepare for a professorship. However, due to family and financial circumstances in 1903 he was forced to return to Ukraine. In Kyiv, he lived for some time on Mykilsko-Botanichna Street in building 25 (the house has not survived to this day) [329]. In 1904, A. Yakovliv passed the state exam at the University of St. Vladimir in Kiev and received a diploma of the first degree. In 1905–1907 he actively and persistently studied Ukrainian law, was elected a member of the Ukrainian Scientific Society and the board of Kyiv's Prosvita. After graduating from university he served in the Kyiv State Chamber, in 1908 he left the civil service and went to the bar [330, p. 284].

During 1906–1907 A. Yakovliv's articles (Revolt of Cherkasy and Kaniv in 1536. Essay on the history of Ukrainian cities ", "Governors, statesmen and elders of the Cherkasy economic castle in the XV-XVI centuries ", "On the history of registration of Ukrainian Cossacks "And other scientific papers) were published in the journal "Ukraine ". [323, p. 3]. The subject of research is the history of Cherkasy region. In the newspaper Hromadska Dumka (later Rada) A. Yakovliv published articles describing the events of that time ("State Economy", "Specific Lands"). When writing articles, he uses the pseudonym "A. Ya.", which was his calling card in the early period of research and social activities [331, p. 264-265].

At the same time, Andriy Ivanovych began active work as a publicist and public figure of national autonomy. During his internship in Warsaw, A. Yakovliv became acquainted with Polish social nation-centered sentiments. In his letters to the second youth of F. Matuszewski, the scientist describes the impressions of Warsaw and its inhabitants in sublime tones. He notes that despite the government's actions, Poles maintain their own linguistic and cultural identity, that the Polish-speaking press and

theater are. According to A. Petryk, it is the Warsaw experience that shapes A. Yakovliv's political and civic views. He became a supporter of the "Ukrainization of the masses" through the introduction of the Ukrainian language in everyday communication, the publication of Ukrainian-language periodicals, the nationalization of theater and literature. It is under such conditions, which should be achieved only through the active educational work of the nationally oriented intelligentsia among the inert and unconscious population of "Greater Ukraine". Thus, the figure believed, it is possible to move away from "smallness" and achieve cultural Ukrainian autonomy, which should be an intermediate stage to cultural independence and, in the long run, political (the apogee of the competition of conscious Ukrainians) [331, p. 264].

In 1911 A. Yakovliv received the right to teach the basics of law and legislation in all commercial schools in Russia, and from that year until the beginning of 1918 he taught at the 1st Kiev Commercial School [323, p. 3]. In 1913, after completing his internship, he became a district attorney for the Kyiv Judicial Chamber. During 1910–1918, he was an assistant legal adviser and later a legal adviser to the Kyiv City Council. For some time Andriy Ivanovych was the Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the Kyiv Bar Association. Having access to the archives of the Moscow administration and the library of the Kyiv Magistrate, he worked on historical materials of Kyiv and published in the "Izvestia of the Kyiv City Duma" [323, p. 3]. In 1914, the article "Suburbs of Kyiv: Priorka, Kurenevka and Syrets" was published [332] - a historical and legal essay on the suburbs of Kyiv. As an assistant to the city's legal adviser, A. Yakovliv was repeatedly published in the newspaper with reports on the distribution of land in Kyiv and the ownership of land in the former Kyiv Fortress. "On the question of the city's right to lands that are within its boundaries and are not listed by anyone under the acts of fortification") [334].

Thus, we note that the historical-legal and national-political views of A. Yakovliv began to form during his studies in 1898-1902 at the Faculty of Law of the University of Dorpat (Tartu). After graduating from the university he is engaged in professional legal and teaching activities in public and educational institutions of Kyiv. The revolution of 1917 intensified the political activity of A. Yakovliv.

7.2 State and political activities of A. Yakovliv during the national liberation struggle of 1917-1921

The February Revolution of 1917 intensified the socio-political activities of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The revolutionary events of the spring of 1917 were greeted with great enthusiasm by the forty-five-year-old, already experienced lawyer-practitioner A. Yakovliv. He was one of the founders of several legal institutions.

In 1917 A. Yakovliv together with the lawyer V. Voitkevych-Pavlovych organized the Ukrainian Bar Association [335, p. 3], was one of the founders of the Ukrainian Law Society in Kyiv, continued to teach at the People's University, where he taught the course of the state budget.

In order to determine the degree of national consciousness of the population of Kyiv and its environs, the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) decided to hold a national demonstration in Kyiv on March 19, 1917. A. Yakovliv was a participant in this manifestation. In his memoirs, he wrote that "this was the first purely Ukrainian national manifestation, it was impressive and aroused great enthusiasm in the Ukrainian citizenship of Kyiv, the surprise of the non-Ukrainian population of Kyiv and the anger of Ukraine's enemies. Tens of thousands of people took part in the demonstration. At the head of the demonstration was a large portrait of Taras Shevchenko, adorned with Ukrainian towels and flowers, followed by the UCR presidium headed by its chairman, Prof. M. Hrushevsky. Then came the army: Constantine's military school in full force and with weapons, followed by ranks of soldiers of the reserve regiments and those who returned from the front; for soldiers thousands of Kyivites and visitors. Blue and yellow flags were in the hands of delegations from all walks of life. The picture was majestic, picturesque, joyful. This is the first time that Ukrainians have had the opportunity to freely and en masse express their nationality, their feelings, desires, and postulates on the streets of golden-domed Kyiv. I saw tears in the eyes of our old leaders, who, having survived the difficult times of the tsarist regime, which seemed to bury the hope of Ukrainian patriots to gain the freedom of Ukraine, waited for better times and this happy day. " [336, p. 3].

On April 6-8, 1917, A. Yakovliv took part in the All-Ukrainian Congress as a representative of the Ukrainian Bar Association and was elected to the Ukrainian Central Council [323, p. 3]. 115 people were elected to the UCR, among them - A. Yakovliv among the twelve "from educational and other organizations of Kyiv." Taking part in the meetings of the UCR, Andriy Ivanovych acted as a speaker on several projects, amendments to old or the adoption of new laws in the field of law and justice. Among other things, at his suggestion, the UCR passed a law that the original formula of laws and court judgments: "By decree of the Provisional Government", which after the abdication of the king replaced the old formula: "By decree of His Imperial Majesty", was replaced by the following: Of the Ukrainian People's Republic ". As a lawyer, A. Yakovliv was successful in adopting several draft laws, despite the opposition of minorities [337, p. 3].

A. Yakovliv was a member of the Radical Democratic Party, which convened a congress on April 8, 1917, at which, in addition to spreading his program, he changed the party name to a new one: the Party of Socialists-Federalists. According to A. Yakovliv, "the name was unsuccessful, did not correspond to the party's program and caused a lot of controversy at the congress, but it was proposed and warmly supported by party leaders S. Yefremov and F. Matushevsky. We were not "socialists", and the federation was not a fundamental postulate of the party. However, the majority voted for the new name, following the "fashion" for socialism that emerged at the time; everyone wanted to be called "socialists", because then only socialist parties, such as the SD and the SR, were successful among the citizens "[336, p. 3].

On April 30, 1917, the Ukrainian Law Society was founded in Kyiv. At the same time, the general meeting of Ukrainian lawyers approved the company's charter and elected its first presidium. It included: M. Tkachenko (chairman), M. Radchenko and A. Yakovliv (comrades of the chairman), Yu. Gaevsky and R. Lashchenko. According to the statute, based on the basic principle that the Ukrainian people must create their own law, the Ukrainian Law Society aimed to unite theoretical and practical forces to: promote the formation and development of Ukrainian law; to cover the process of Ukrainization of modern law in Ukraine; practically help the Ukrainianization of all

state and public institutions and in general the Ukrainianization of the legal basis of life in Ukraine; to promote the formation of the Ukrainian legal language. The Ukrainian Law Society was the main organizer of the Ukrainian Law Congress, which took place on June 13–14, 1917 in Kyiv [338, p. 198-199].

The congress was chaired by a well-known lawyer and public figure M. Levitsky, and M. Hrushevsky was elected honorary chairman. A. Yakovliv's report "On Legal Terminology and Legal Language" was heard. The participants of the congress supported the 1st Universal of the UCR published the day before and decided to immediately start the restoration and creation of Ukrainian law on the basis of science, life and legal consciousness of the people, in accordance with the conditions of new life. It was considered necessary to introduce the Ukrainian language in courts and notaries, while ensuring the rights of national minorities to take legal action in their native language. The Ukrainian Law Society was instructed to draw up a program of activities for the development of Ukrainian legal terminology, to elect an editorial board of lawyers and philologists to compile the relevant terminology dictionary. The congress established the Kyiv Regional Judicial Committee to maintain links between the UCR and local courts. G. Vovkushevsky, V. Voitkevych-Pavlovych, Y. Gaevsky, R. Lashchenko, G. Lemekh (Lemekha), Z. Margulis, M. Radchenko, M. Tkachenko and A. Yakovliv were elected to it [338, p. 201].

The Ukrainian Central Rada had to fight for Ukraine's autonomous rights for a long time with Russian political parties: the Social Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Cadets, and national minorities in Ukraine: Russians, Poles, and Jews. Both everywhere in Russia and in Kyiv, a Council of Soldiers', Workers', and Peasants' Deputies was formed, which tried to oppose itself to the Central Council and even tried to seize power. In order to reach an agreement with the Council of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the Central Rada sent a delegation to the meeting of the Rada, of which A. Yakovliv was also a member. Recalling this, he wrote, "the meetings were, so to speak, permanent, lasting days and nights, so that the delegates of the Central Committee had to take turns, some sitting during the day, others at night.

Meetings for Ukrainians were of no interest, they were filled with endless speeches and "tea and fire" a huge number of sandwiches with ham, veal, cheese, etc. " [339, p. 3].

A. Yakovliv characterizes the policy of the Provisional Government: "despite the fact that it consisted of a majority of left-wing ministers, it adhered to a specific Russian tactic: either give nothing or give as little as possible; and what they had to give against their will and desire, then in various lateral ways to reduce or even eliminate " [339, p. 3].

A. Yakovliv believes that the First Universal June 10, 1917"Made a great impression not only in Ukraine but in Russia as a whole... This fact was of great legal importance because it transformed the Central Rada from the Ukrainian national body into the universally recognized by the population of Ukraine supreme legislative body of autonomous Ukraine" [339, p. 3].

The significance of the Second Universal, according to A. Yakovliv, is that all power in Ukraine was transferred to the General Secretariat, the Third Universal is that the General Secretariat, supplemented by ministers from national minorities, takes over all power in Ukraine , and the UCR becomes the supreme legislative body of the UPR. The Ukrainian language was recognized as the state language [339, p. 3].

According to A. Yakovliv, the first stage of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for the restoration of their state independence ended in victory.

In his Memoirs, he negatively assessed the policy of Soviet Russia, which, despite the proclamation of the principle of "self-determination until secession", interfered in the UPR's internal affairs, criticizing the UPR government's order on agrarian policy, and accused the UPR of "bourgeoisie." He criticizes the policies of the Entente governments, which demanded that Ukraine not move troops to the east, where the Red Army was grouped, but increase the number of troops on the Western Front in the interests of war with the German coalition. Andriy Ivanovych believed that "the Secretary General first had to hastily send a military force against the Red Army of the Bolsheviks, which pushed him further from Kharkiv to Kyiv... The military command had to take military formations from other shades of the Eastern Front and transfer them to defend the Kyiv direction » [340, p. 3].

A. Yakovliv, believes that "the Ukrainian delegation to the Brest peace talks as part of the largest Ukrainian parties: from the SD party - M. Levitsky and N. Porsche, from the SR party - O. Sevryuk and V. Golubovich had to fight on two fronts: against Germans and against the Bolsheviks, conducted negotiations talentedly and achieved significant political and diplomatic success [341, p. 3].

In order to weaken the position of Soviet Russia at the world conference, the UCR decided to legislate the state independence of the UPR, which had already taken place on January 9/22, 1918 in Kyiv on Sophia Square. The Ukrainian Central Rada solemnly announced its IV Universal on the full independence of the Ukrainian State in the form of the Ukrainian People's Republic and thus abolished the III Universal, which proclaimed the independence of Ukraine as part of the future federation with Russia [341, p. 3].

Assessing the significance of this important event in the history of the UPR, A. Yakovliv recalls that: "The Ukrainian people, through their 800 representatives, members of the UCR, recognized and formally proclaimed their full, unlimited state independence and their independent state - the Ukrainian People's Republic. With this solemn act, the Ukrainian people forever "self-determined", before the whole world showed their unshakable will to be the master of their great-grandfather's land, to live in their own independent state - the UPR. This manifestation of the will of the free Ukrainian people cannot be deprived of any legal force, no coercion, no non-recognition by other states or peoples. IV Universal of the supreme legislative body of Ukraine - the Ukrainian Central Council, was, is and will be the Charter of Freedom of the Ukrainian People, an act that proclaimed January 9/22, 1918 state independence and independence of Ukraine forever " [341, p. 3].

This Universal accelerated the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Central Powers, all of which formally recognized the independence of the UPR.

During the Bolshevik uprising of January 16-22, 1918 in Kyiv, A. Yakovliv found himself at the center of events. The insurgents managed to seize the arsenal with guns and other weapons, sit in it and start shelling the center of Kiev with guns. The insurgents also seized several police stations, including Starokyivska, which was next

to the apartment at the corner of V. Volodymyrska Street and Sofia Square, where A. Yakovliv lived with his wife and children [342, p. 3]. He wrote in "Memoirs" - on the balcony of the 2nd floor, government officials set up a machine gun, which fired on the street, square and Starokyivska police station, where the insurgents settled. Therefore, everyone had to stay at home, and the gate to the yard and the exits from the house to Sofiyivska Square and Volodymyrska Street were closed and a guard was posted" [341, p. 3].

On January 26, 1918, Bolshevik troops under the command of M. Muravyov captured Kyiv. Despite the fact that the Presidium and most of the members of the Central Rada left the city after the capture of Kyiv by the Bolsheviks, A. Yakovliv remained in Kyiv. With the arrival of the Bolsheviks, terrible days and nights of terror, murder, and looting began for the people of Kyiv. When he learned that they were looking for members of the Central Committee, A. Yakovliv burned his membership card and did not go outside. A few days later, he was summoned to the city council, where he held the position of assistant legal counsel, to "take care of the validity of the city government." He was issued a certificate certified by the Red Commissioner, which allowed him to move freely and perform official duties [342, p. 3].

After the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty on February 9, 1918 and an agreement with the German and Austrian governments to liberate Ukraine from Bolshevik occupation, Ukrainian units led by General K. Prisoysky and S. Petliura, together with German and Austrian units, fought successfully on the Right Bank and on March 1. In 1918 Kyiv was liberated.

The Central Rada and the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic returned to the capital. The Central Council began regular work and there was a need for a permanent office. The head of the UCR, M. Hrushevsky, invited A. Yakovliv to be the director of the UPR chancellery. The new director took organizational measures for the functioning of the office, divided the powers between the four secretaries, and appointed their assistants. He himself took over the leadership of the codification department, which performed a very important task - the systematization of UCR legislation. Information and financial departments were also established, the publishing

house of the official magazine was organized: "News of the Central Council" [343, p. 3].

The special commission drafted the Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the law on national and personal autonomy for national minorities. A. Yakovliv was credited with the authorship of the "Constitution of the UPR", but he, already in the United States, in January 1953 in the pages of "Freedom" denied this: - "I was not the author of the Constitution of the UPR. The author of the draft Constitution was the following. in memory of the Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Council, Prof. M. Hrushevsky. " [344, p. 3].

A. Yakovliv took a direct part in the organization of the Supreme Court, which was called the "General Court". Almost every session of the Minor Council he reported on the organization of the General Court and proposed the appointment of O. Shelukhin, A. Margolin, and several members of the Kyiv Judicial Chamber and the Russian Senate, who were prominent lawyers of Ukrainian descent or of Ukrainian descent to the UPR. A. Yakovliv's candidacy was also proposed, but he refused, arguing that he was not old enough to sit in the Ukrainian Senate [345, p. 3].

In the process of international recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic, especially after the signing of the Brest Treaty, the question of establishing diplomatic missions of Ukraine arose. Article IV of this document stated that "diplomatic and consular relations between the parties to the treaty will begin immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. Certain conditions are reserved for the greatest possible admission of the consuls of both sides. " In the spring of 1918, a consular department headed by an experienced government official O. Sukhovskiy began its work within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) [346, p. 24].

Germany and its allies sent diplomatic representatives to Kyiv: Germany - Ambassador, Baron von Mumm; Austria-Hungary - Ambassador, Count Forgach; Bulgaria - Ambassador, Prof. Шиманова; Turkey - Ambassador Ahmed Mukhtar Bey.

The first permanent diplomatic missions of the Ukrainian People's Republic are being introduced in the countries of the Fourth Union. March 16, 1918A temporary representative of the Ukrainian People's Republic, a member of the Ukrainian Central

Committee O. Sevryuk, went to Germany, and on March 17, 1918 a member of the Ukrainian People's Republic M. Levitsky was appointed temporary representative in Turkey [347, p. 85]. To Bulgaria, later, under Hetman P. Skoropadsky - O. Shulgin, and to Austria-Hungary - A. Yakovliv.

The principle of establishing diplomatic representations, their status, and the formation of staffs was twofold and borrowed from the system of the Russian diplomatic service. The first rank was given to the Ukrainian embassies in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, whose chairmen had the status of resident ministers and had the right to independently form the composition of the representation. The second rank included other representatives of the UPR abroad, whose heads were nominated attorneys for charge (*charge d'affaires*) [346, p. 24].

A. Yakovliv's appointment came as a surprise to him. M. Hrushevsky invited him to become the ambassador to Austria-Hungary, who believed that "Andriy Ivanovych has an advantage over others because he knows theoretical international law, that he is a lawyer and also a lawyer. This is enough to start a career as a diplomat "[348, p. 2]. The main task facing the diplomat in Vienna was the ratification by Austria-Hungary of the Brest Peace Treaty, which the Austrians deliberately postponed. Before the trip, M. Hrushevsky gave a number of practical tips, recommended to meet the ambassadors: Yevhen Petrushevych, who was the chairman of the club of Ukrainian ambassadors in parliament, with Ambassador K. Levitsky and the Minister of Health, Professor I. Gorbachevsky [348, p. 2].

On April 21, 1918, in a separate car of the 2nd class, together with three government officials, A. Yakovliv left for Vienna. He invited D. Doroshenko, who was going to Lviv for literary affairs, to his car. At the border in Pidvolochysk they boarded an Austrian train full of passengers and arrived in Lviv. Late in the evening of April 23, the delegation arrived in Vienna. Professor Stepan Smal-Stotsky helped to settle in Vienna [348, p. 2].

The next day, A. Yakovliv rented an apartment for the UPR embassy, which consisted of a salon, two bedrooms and a bathhouse at the Bristol Hotel in central Vienna. On the same day, unofficially, before the meeting with the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, A. Yakovliv talked to local correspondents, told them about Kyiv, about Ukraine in general, and presented some biographical facts. In the following days, A. Yakovliv visited the President of the Ukrainian Embassy Club E. Petrushevysh in the House of Parliament, where he, as the leader of Ukrainian ambassadors, had his office, met his son, who recently graduated from university, knew German and French and invited him to work as diplomatic secretary. The diplomat also met with deputies of the Austrian Parliament K. Levitsky and M. Vasylo. Vasylo had many connections and influences among Austrian-Hungarian political circles and repeatedly helped A. Yakovliv as ambassador. During the meeting of Ukrainian deputies of the Austrian Parliament, organized by E. Petrushevysh, A. Yakovliv met with Minister I. Gorbachevsky, B. Levitsky, K. Trylovsky and others who were sincerely interested in the events in Ukraine [349, p. 2].

In early May 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry agreed to receive the Ukrainian ambassador. Von Flotov appointed him a day and time of appointment. On the appointed day, taking young Petrushevysh with him, A. Yakovliv met with Deputy Foreign Minister von Flotov, and the Minister left for Romania for talks. Von Flotov did not welcome A. Yakovliv and stated that he was not a full-fledged ambassador. AND. Yakovliv, then decisively noted that in Vienna he has such a situation and such rights as the ambassador of the Austro-Hungarian state in Kiev, Count Forgach [349, p. 2]. The reason for the negative attitude towards A. Yakovliv was the events that took place in Ukraine in connection with the coup and the coming to power of Hetman P. Skoropadsky.

In the first hetman's government, the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs belonged to N. Vasylenko, who, although a Ukrainian, belonged to the Russian Cadet Party and collaborated with the Russian magazine *Kyivskaya Mysl*. After accepting the ministry, N. Vasylenko first recalled the ambassadors appointed by the Central Rada, including A. Yakovliv, but did not inform the dismissed, so the ambassadors remained in office for several months, unaware that they were already deprived of diplomatic powers. A. Yakovliv learned about his release through his courier, whom he sent to Kyiv in early June for news. Thus, from the very beginning of his diplomatic

activity, his status was twofold: he considered himself a full-fledged ambassador of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Austria-Hungary, and meanwhile, formally had no right to represent the Ukrainian People's Republic, which had ceased to exist. A. Yakovliv did not know, but the Austrian Foreign Ministry was well informed about this, which also for some reason did not consider it necessary to inform him and did not forbid him to continue to perform the functions of ambassador. Deputy Minister, von Flotov and Minister Count Burian, received from A. Yakovliv statements, diplomatic notes, but did not respond, in the conversation was limited to various promises [349, p. 2]. He visited the Foreign Ministry every day, waiting for an answer.

A. Petryk believes that one of the reasons for A. Yakovliv's resignation was the conflict that arose almost immediately between the ambassador and the embassy secretary and the translator Bodnar. In his telegram to Kyiv, A. Yakovliv asked the ministry to dismiss the official, arguing that he had a complete lack of qualifications and communication skills in the "relevant high society." The ambassador asked to appoint his acquaintance, the Ukrainian emigrant M. Trotsky, the editor of the *Visnyk*, which was published at the expense of the Ukrainian community in Vienna. M. Trotsky was appointed, however, the situation in the embassy staff remained tense. In turn, the staff (probably Bodnar and Kosinin, dismissed on the initiative of the ambassador) reported "indecent" behavior of Ambassador A. Yakovliv. After returning to Kyiv, former diplomats continued to slander Andriy Ivanovych. They reported in the Ministry that "the ambassador drinks and walks in Vienna in various inappropriate societies, degrading the dignity of the Ambassador of the Ukrainian State." This information became known to the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to Ukraine - Count Forgach, who at an official reception of Hetman P. Skoropadsky told the head of state about the rumors and advised to recall A. Yakovliv. D. Doroshenko, as the head of the diplomatic mission and the direct head of the ambassador, invited him to Kyiv and offered to move to the Ministry, heading the Department of Foreign Relations. A. Yakovliv immediately agreed, but on the condition that he stays in Vienna until the arrival of a new ambassador - V. Lypynsky [331, p. 267].

A.Yakovliv, believes that the "cleansing" among the diplomatic representatives of the UPR was favorable for German policy towards Ukraine, but basically undermined the independence of the Ukrainian state, which was recognized in the Brest Treaty "[349, p. 2].

In addition to the main agreement with the four states concluded in Brest, our delegation managed to conclude a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary, on the basis of which it undertook to issue a law on the territorial autonomy of Galicia and Bukovina. This treaty was to be ratified separately and M. Hrushevsky instructed A. Yakovliv to demand its ratification in the first place. During meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Burian A. Yakovliv constantly reminded about this case, and he limited himself to promises to ratify in due time [350, p. 2].

The unsatisfactory state of communications between the diplomatic mission and the government of the republic had a negative effect on the efficiency of the mission. The embassy lacked specific guidelines from the Center and information material on the situation in Ukraine. According to A. Yakovliv's report, the mission, despite a previous agreement with the Central Bureau of the Central Rada, received virtually no Ukrainian press. "Without magazines, the ambassador said, I feel completely cut off from Ukraine and have no information." Even to obtain such extremely important information as the ratification of the Brest Peace Agreement by Ukraine, A. Yakovliv was forced to go to the Berlin embassy of the Ukrainian People's Republic [351, p. 50].

During the meeting O.Sevryuk provided him with important information on Germany's general policy towards Ukraine and handed over a copy of the secret agreement. The treaty stated that the Austro-Hungarian government had undertaken to ratify the treaty by July 20, 1918, by approving it through parliament. At the same time, O. Sevryuk warned A. Yakovliv that he would not give the text of the agreement to anyone in Vienna, so that sometimes its content would not get to the press, and this would provoke opposition from Poles and then the parliament may refuse to approve it [350, p. 2].

A. Yakovliv regularly informed Kyiv about the ambassadorial activity, but the Foreign Ministry did not answer that he was very worried, he did not know what was

happening in Kyiv after the coup, which is now the government, who is the chief foreign minister, what is his legal status, whether he is still an ambassador or perhaps already fired. In order to get some information, A. Yakovliv sent an official to Kyiv, I. Kosynyn, in the second half of May, with a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The official left, there were no rumors about him for a long time, he returned to Vienna in early June, bringing a lot of news, including an official statement dated early May, in which Minister N. Vasylenko informed A. Yakovliv that he had been fired. ambassador, but that he should remain in Vienna and perform the duties of ambassador until the arrival of a successor who has not yet been appointed. I. Kosynin also said that a new minister, D. Doroshenko, had been appointed to replace N. Vasylenko. Having received such information, A. Yakovliv decided to go to Kyiv and find out what was going on there and what he should do: whether to wait for his successor in Vienna, or move to Kyiv [350, p. 2].

A. Yakovliv left for Kyiv on June 7 by a short road through Radyvyliv and on the morning of June 9 he was already in Kyiv. The next day A. Yakovliv, at the invitation of his neighbor, Minister of Finance of the Hetman's government Rzhepetsky, took part in the grand opening of the Academy of Arts, where he introduced A. Yakovliv to Hetman P. Skoropadsky [352, p. 2].

On June 11, 1918, A. Yakovliv met with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Doroshenko, who asked to return to Vienna before the appointment of a new ambassador and acted as ambassador. Andriy Ivanovych agreed, provided that "he can wait no more than a month, because his position as dismissed ambassador to Vienna is extremely difficult and unhelpful for the Ukrainian state, that the ratification of the secret treaty and other important matters require decisive steps before the Austro-Hungarian government" [352, p. 2].

During the meeting, A. Yakovliv handed D. Doroshenko a copy of the secret agreement, which was not in the ministry, and two draft diplomatic notes: one touched on the secret agreement and required the acceleration of its ratification; the second demanded the liberation of the Ukrainian lands of Kholm, Podlasie, and parts of Volhynia from the occupation of the Austrian army and their transfer to the control of

the Hetman's government, in accordance with the peace treaty. At the same time, A. Yakovliv suggested that when the text of the notes is approved by the Council of Ministers, Doroshenko will hand over one copy of the notes in Kyiv to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Forgach, and A. Yakovliv, returning to Vienna, will pass the notes to Foreign Minister Burian [352, p. 2].

During his stay in Kyiv, despite the bans, A. Yakovliv met with M. Hrushevsky, who was under house arrest. After the meeting with M. Hrushevsky, A. Yakovliv noted that: "although it was difficult for him (M. Hrushevsky) to sit under house arrest, he was not such a man to lose his spiritual balance and clarity of thought. He treated all the events as a great scholar-historian and in his spiritual eyes what happened to him personally took the least place. He was firmly convinced that the hetman's regime would not last long and the free and independent UPR would return [352, p. 2].

On June 12, A. Yakovliv took part in a meeting of the Socialist-Federalist Party, at which he reported on his activities as ambassador to Vienna. The Socialist-Federalist Party had a negative attitude towards Hetman P. Skoropadsky, his government, and policies, but found it useful for party members to hold positions in ministries other than ministers and to overcome the Russification of state institutions and Ukrainianize them. Therefore, it was also recommended to return to A. Yakovliv in Vienna [352, p. 2].

Some time later, D. Doroshenko informed A. Yakovliv that the Council of Ministers approved the text of both notes with some minor amendments and agreed to pass these notes to the Minister, Count Burian in Vienna, and in Kyiv they will be on the same day. transferred to the ambassadors, Count Forgach [354, p. 2]. A. Yakovliv returned to Vienna and on the appointed day passed both notes to Count Burian, noting that the notes with the same content were passed on to the ambassador, Count Forgach. The Minister accepted the notes and promised to announce the response of the Austro-Hungarian government.

Given the information that the UPR had disrupted certain supplies of bread, on June 18, 1918, S. Burian instructed the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin to inform the Allies about the possible declaration by Austria-Hungary of the Brest Peace Treaty invalid. The next day, the Minister also sent similar messages to the

ambassadors in Bulgaria and Turkey [353, p. 125]. Relations between the two countries began to deteriorate.

In order to assess the attitude to Ukraine, A. Yakovliv visited some foreign ambassadors. He had a long and interesting conversation with the German ambassador, Prince Hohenlohe, and gave him the impression that Germany was a major factor in Ukraine's policy and that Austria-Hungary's policy was subordinated to the smallest detail to Germany, without whose consent the Austrian government could not. step to step. He also visited the ambassadors of Bulgaria and Turkey [354, p. 2].

A. Yakovliv also visited the Spanish Consul General, who also served as Ambassador of Spain, who protected the citizens of the Entente and the former Russia. The Ukrainian diplomat has been with him several times in the field of legal protection of Ukrainian citizens, and explained to him that there is now an independent Ukrainian State, of which he is an accredited ambassador to the Austro-Hungarian government. The consul argued for a long time, defending his right to the care of the citizens of the former Russia, but finally agreed to transfer the protection of Ukrainians to the Ukrainian ambassador [355, p. 2].

During his stay in Austria-Hungary, A. Yakovliv, who facilitated the release of Ukrainian prisoners of war, registered all prisoners in all camps. Combat Administration of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, formed in 1917 in the city of Freistadt on the initiative of D. Dontsov [331, p. 266] began to form a division. Addressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador of the Ukrainian People's Republic proposed the establishment of a Commission at the Ukrainian Embassy in Vienna, as the Combat Command of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine did not have an official mandate. The functions of the institution were to collect information on the census of prisoners, the process of forming Ukrainian military organizations and the return of prisoners to Ukraine [331, p. 267]. In order to be constantly aware of everything that is being done in the organization of captured Ukrainians, their return to Ukraine, he considers it necessary to have a temporary military agent who would know the location of the camps. He proposed for this position his brother, the chicken of the 1st Regiment of the Captive Division, which was formed in Volodymyr-Volynskyi -

Hryhoriy Yakovliv, who had the rank of captain, was in Austrian captivity for two years, held three camps personally captured Ukrainian officers. He argued that the service abroad requires special trust and confidence - "I can rely on my brother more than anyone" [356, p. 1].

In order to help Ukrainians who were in Austria-Hungary, A. Yakovliv organized a consular department. There were few citizens of Greater Ukraine in Vienna, and consular work was limited to the issuance of several passports and certificates. In his "Memoirs" for 1918-1919, A. Yakovliv recalls that "one of the first clients of the consular department was Princess Dolgorukova from Korsun, an old, very nice Russian aristocrat who spoke Russian correctly, but as if she were translating her conversation from French. She came to the embassy to get a Ukrainian passport, because, as she explained, when the Ukrainian State came into being, she believes that she must have a Ukrainian passport to live abroad " [354, p. 2].

A. Yakovliv, in Memoirs, cites the untimely arrival of the new ambassador V. Lypynsky, who was to arrive in Vienna by July 1, 1918, and the incident with notes to Austria-Hungary, in which D. Doroshenko was a participant. Without waiting for the arrival of the new ambassador V. Lypynsky, A. Yakovliv left Vienna on July 10 and left for Kyiv. He left the office of the embassy to the secretary A. Petrushevych, to help him left the government official I. Kosinin, providing them with a monthly salary, paid for hotel accommodation and left just in case a couple of thousand crowns in current bank accounts [354, p. 2].

Arriving in Kyiv on the morning of July 12, the same day he went to the ministry to report to Minister Doroshenko, and learned there that Lypynsky had not yet left for Vienna, but was preparing and would leave soon. A. Yakovliv informed D. Doroshenko that he had given both notes of the agreed day to the Minister, Count Burian. D. Doroshenko replied that he had sent a note in the Kholmshchyna case to Count Forgach on the same day, but as for the note in the secret agreement case, a very unpleasant story had happened to it. He handed over the texts of both notes to the office for the production of blank copies, which he had to hand over to Forgach after signing. They brought him the originals to sign, he signed them and ordered the note in the

Kholm region to be sent by special courier to the Austrian ambassador, and the second note in the secret treaty, he was detained for another day to personally hand over to Count Forgach. Meanwhile, drafts of both notes were handed over by the office to the information department of the ministry, which was accessible to newspaper correspondents. There it was read by a correspondent of "Kiev Thought", wrote down its contents and the next day, in the morning, the texts of both notes were published in this magazine, so Forgach learned in the morning from "Kiev Thought" about the note in the secret agreement before receiving it from the Minister. On the same day, he came to D. Doroshenko and strongly protested against the fact that the note appeared in the press before the minister sent him the original, and also complained that the ministry did not comply with the terms of this agreement and allowed the note to be published in the press. concerning the secret agreement "[354, p. 2].

D. Doroshenko, so that Count Forgach did not complain about it to Hetman P. Skoropadsky and he did not lose his post, given that A. Yakovliv is temporarily ambassador to Austria-Hungary, said that such a note, which was published in "Kiev Thought", he did not sign and it does not really exist because what was published, only the project, which was compiled by our Ambassador A. Yakovliv, and brought for testing by the government, but the project was not tested. Along with other papers, he accidentally got into the information department of the office, where he was written off by a correspondent. " D. Doroshenko apologized to A. Yakovliv for shifting the blame on him [354, p. 2].

A few days after the meeting with D. Doroshenko, A. Yakovliv made a report at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was attended by advisers to the Ministry, shortly before that appointed: Professor O. Eichelmann and M. Slavinsky, and Director of the Chancellery I. Measured, and a few more people. In his report, A. Yakovliv informed about the policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary towards Ukraine, the secret agreement and its terms, the need to encourage Austria-Hungary to ratify the previously set deadline - July 20, despite the stubborn opposition of Polish and Hungarian influential politicians . In the report, Andriy Ivanovych reported on his measures to establish relations with the Entente states through the Spanish consul in

Vienna and expressed the opinion that one should try to establish relations through ambassadors of neutral states, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Holland [354, p. 2].

The development of foreign relations required the reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the initial stage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had only one general office, which performed everything necessary for the functioning of the ministry. With the participation of O. Eichelman and D. Doroshenko, several departments were organized, headed by directors. An advisory body was also established under the Minister of Foreign Affairs - the Council of Ministers, consisting of advisers, directors of departments, and an executive body - the Office of the Ministry. In addition, two other departments were organized: foreign relations and consular. The Chancellery was headed by its director - I. Mirnyi, the director of the Consular Department was K. Lossky, and the position of director of the Department of Foreign Relations was offered to A. Yakovliv, who after the incident with the note did not want to serve under D. Doroshenko. But after discussing this proposal at a meeting of the Socialist-Federalist Party, which insisted that he accept the post, saying that the ministry already serves I. Mirny and K. Lossky, and when he also takes the post of director of the most important department, then the whole ministry will be entirely Ukrainian, it was emphasized that he is the best prepared of all possible candidates for the position of director of the department, A. Yakovliv agreed to the appointment [354, p. 2].

On July 13, 1918, Hetman P. Skoropadsky issued Order 97 on the appointment of Andriy Ivanovych Yakovliv as the Director of the Department of Foreign Relations [36, p. arch. 8] and only on October 1, 1918 Order № 268 on the dismissal of the official from the post of Ambassador of the Ukrainian state in Austria-Hungary from October 1, 1918 [358, p. 20].

At the initial stage, Andriy Ivanovych dealt with organizational and personnel issues, recruited government officials, distributed responsibilities among them, determined the hours of reception, and M. Levitsky, the former ambassador to Turkey, was appointed vice-director. Most government officials did not have clerical practice, so he himself had to sort correspondence, compose answers to inquiries, some

documents he signed himself, others carried to the Minister for signature, or for a report. Documents of the department were kept in Ukrainian, returned to inquiries in Russian with the addition that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requires compliance with the law on the official language [354, p. 2].

During this period, in addition to working in the Department of Foreign Relations, A. Yakovliv served in the evenings as a legal adviser to the legal department of the city administration. He was forced to stop practicing law, did not take new cases, and handed over those he had to his assistant [354, p. 2].

As the head of the department, Andriy Ivanovych continued to take part in negotiations with the Germans and Austrians on the transfer of prisoners and the fulfillment of Ukraine's obligations to the Central Bloc [331, p. 266].

Working in the ministry, A. Yakovliv dealt with the return of Ukrainians to their homeland. He distinguished himself as one of the authors of the agreement between Ukraine and the Central Powers of April 19, 1918 on streamlining the relocation of citizens. Another significant personal achievement of A. Yakovliv-diplomat was his participation in the Ukrainian-Romanian commission on concluding a trade agreement between the states [331, p. 266-267].

At the end of 1918, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine decided to send a diplomatic mission to Belgium and the Netherlands. However, due to the lack of funds in the state treasury, it was decided to form a joint diplomatic mission, which was to work in the two countries [359, p. 189]. The official appointment of the composition and leadership of the mission took place on January 5, 1919 [360, p. 196]. The mission included A. Yakovliv (head of the mission), Andriy-Heinrich Varketin (first secretary), Yakiv Kulisher (second secretary), Mykola Panasevych (attache), Petro Kovalev (attache), Mykola Tikhomirov (government official), Gustav Ver-Elst (government official) [360, p. 197]. All mission staff spoke not only the major European languages but also the languages of the countries of destination. The budget of the mission was 106,800 hryvnias per month [361, p. 65].

On a trip to Holland, the mission left Kyiv on January 19, 1919 by road through Volochysk, Ternopil, Stryi, Lavochno, Munkach (Mukachevo), Budapest, Vienna [362, p. 20].

On January 20, 1919, the Netherlands appointed Dr. T. Fokker Consul General in Kyiv [363, p. 65], which indicates that the Netherlands wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the UPR.

The mission arrived in Vienna on January 25. During their few days in Vienna, the embassies of Paris, the Czech Republic, the United States, Denmark and the Berlin embassies gathered here. Several meetings with representatives of missions and embassies took place in Vienna [362, p. 20].

On January 28, the mission left for Berlin via Munich. The consul of the Ukrainian People's Republic P. Orenchuk met the mission in Munich and said that he had good and quite friendly relations with the German government [362, p. 20].

The mission arrived in Berlin on January 30 at the Ukrainian embassy, which was still run by the ambassador's protégés under Hetman F. Steingel. The mission left Berlin early on February 3 and arrived at the Dutch border the same day, at 5 p.m. Here the mission was awaited by a separate car provided by the Dutch government. In this car, the mission arrived in The Hague on February 3 at 11 am [362, p. 21].

A few days after arriving in The Hague, A. Yakovliv sent the secretary to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask when he could be received by the Minister. The Secretary-General replied that the Ukrainian government had not yet recognized the Entente, so the Dutch government could not accept the head of the mission. he also did not receive [362, p. 21]. The head of the mission states the reason for the refusal to recognize it as: communication with the Germans, to whom she constantly supplied grain. In the same position as the mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic was the then ambassador of Czechoslovakia, whom the Minister did not accept and did not recognize "[362, p. 21].

However, despite the official non-recognition of the Ukrainian mission by the Dutch Foreign Ministry, other ministries considered the mission an official representative of the UPR. And then the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

noted that "... they do not see the need to hinder the mission in its cause, as they are certain that the UPR will soon be officially recognized." Due to this, Dutch government circles avoided conducting political negotiations with representatives of the UPR, so Ukrainian diplomats from the very beginning of their activities were deprived of the opportunity to conduct practical diplomatic work aimed at recognizing Ukraine's independence [361, p. 65].

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized the passports of the mission's representatives as diplomatic, and they were all given the right to extraterritoriality [362, p. 21].

Dutch political parties were mostly negative about the imperialist policies of the Bolsheviks and sympathized with the Ukrainians in their struggle. In particular, at the suggestion of the local Communist Party to establish economic relations with Soviet Russia, the States-General twice vetoed it in 1919. In its policy, the Netherlands strongly opposed any imperialism. Also, political circles of the country were grateful to the Ukrainian government for the care of the Dutch Mennonites, who at that time lived in Ukraine 60-80 thousand [361, p. 65]. Mennonites are members of the Protestant movement, founded by Menno Simons, who were resettled during the reign of Catherine II in the southern steppes of Ukraine. The doctrine promotes peaceful coexistence in a secular society, the absence of violence, non-violent methods of protest and dispute resolution, and pacifism. Back in the summer of 1917. Simultaneously with the Crimean Tatars, the Mennonites of Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Northern Tavria recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kyiv [364, p. 26]. Instead, the Ukrainian central government guaranteed the Mennonite communities their state support in the economic and cultural spheres [359, p. 190]. In the Netherlands itself, there were about 60,000 of them, but they played a significant role in society, their representatives held the positions of ministers, ambassadors, there were many bankers who influenced the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They were concerned about the fate of their relatives in Ukraine during the Bolshevik and Denikin occupations, there were many publications about them in the press, and a special Mennonite Aid Committee was set up in Ukraine, which raised several thousand

guilders. A. Varketin, a secretary of the diplomatic mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic in The Hague, who came from the Dutch Mennonites in Ukraine, was invited to this committee as a member [364, p. 26].

As head of the diplomatic mission, A. Yakovliv issued orders, which were recorded in the "Book of orders of the head of the mission" (a total of 98 orders). In the first order, the diplomat defined the mission's work schedule and distributed responsibilities among the mission members.

In March 1919, a fair-exhibition of samples of goods took place in Utrecht, which was of great commercial importance and to which Ukrainian diplomats were invited. The organizers of the exhibition singled out a separate bureau decorated with Ukrainian flags [365, p. 22]. A. Yakovliv noted that the political recognition of Ukraine by the Netherlands will be possible only with the establishment of permanent economic relations between the countries. In 1919, the Dutch Ministries of Trade and Industry had high hopes for this [361, p. 65].

According to A. Yakovliv, one of the signs of official recognition of the mission in the Netherlands is that it received the right to issue passports to Ukrainians to travel from the Netherlands to Ukraine, Germany, Belgium, England, America and France. All issued passports were recognized by these states. Even when the Austrian embassy was ordered not to issue passports to Galicians, it sent everyone who needed passports or visas to travel to Ukraine to our mission [362, p. 22]. For comparison, Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Great Britain and France were forbidden to issue passports [359, p. 192]. V. Solovyova believes that the diplomatic mission in the Netherlands was, in fact, one of the few Ukrainian representations abroad that issued documents recognized by all European countries [360, p. 198].

Representatives of the diplomatic mission in the Netherlands provided assistance to Ukrainians, whom A. Yakovliv divides into Ukrainians who have lived freely in the Netherlands for a long time, those who moved from Belgium during the war and prisoners or fugitives from German camps [362, p. 23]. In order to inform about the work of the mission in the Netherlands, an advertisement was published in various magazines urging Ukrainian citizens to register for the mission. From different

categories of our citizens, special attention was drawn to migrants from Belgium and our prisoners. The first are permanent residents of Belgium, Antwerp, the so-called "diamonds". That is, the owners of diamond grinding factories and workers in these factories. They are mostly Jews from Galicia. Following a truce with the Germans, the Belgian government called on all "diamond workers" to return to Belgium to reopen the factories, but the question arose of obtaining "new passports by diamond workers because old Austrian passports were no longer valid." The Polish delegation in The Hague called on "diamond makers" to take Polish passports, but the diamond makers, all as one, said they would only come with Ukrainian passports, that they were valid citizens of the Ukrainian Republic from Galicia and Bukovina. The Belgian government then agreed to accept them with Ukrainian passports. Mission staff, having checked the place of birth, whether it belongs to Eastern Galicia or Bukovina issued passports [362, p. 23].

The second category is German refugees, there were quite a few of them in the Netherlands before the mission arrived, more than five hundred. But before the arrival of the mission, the Dutch government, fearing Bolshevism and considering every Russian soldier a Bolshevik, took them to Danzig, from where they got not to their homeland, but to the Polish army [362, p. 23]. The government of the Ukrainian People's Republic has allocated 20,000 rubles to help Ukrainian prisoners of war [359, p. 190]. Representatives of the mission tried to free and send them through Germany and the Czech Republic. To return to Ukraine, these Ukrainians were given ten guilders and one hundred German marks each [351, p. 24]. Thanks to the work of the mission, 80 Ukrainian prisoners of war were sent from Ukraine to the Netherlands, who were issued passports and travel funds. The situation with prisoners in Belgium was more complicated. Most Ukrainians were recruited by Polish and Russian representatives, and only a few dozen people volunteered to join the UPR army [361, p. 65-66].

Not being officially recognized and not being able to act diplomatically, the mission turned its full attention to activating the press. A. Yakovliv wrote that "time demands from us the greatest work on the part of daily truthful information. We had to catch up with what we all lost because of our own unconsciousness, Europe knew

nothing about us, and if it did, it knew everything against us. Now everything needs to be reworked, and this is hard and maybe not noticeable black at first glance work " [362, p. 26].

The Dutch press provided information about Ukraine based on materials from the Russian and Polish press, treated them as Bolsheviks, and scolded them as much as possible. A. Yakovliv, with the help of Ukrainians who have long lived in the Netherlands and were acquainted with the press, invited journalists to breakfast. In order to get acquainted with the latest events in Ukraine, the head of the mission wrote and printed a detailed memorandum, which was translated into Dutch, German, French and English and distributed to the press during breakfast [362, p. 24]. Breakfast had extremely good results. On the second day, detailed information about Ukraine appeared in all magazines on the basis of a memorandum, and then every day one or another newspaper wrote something about Ukraine [362, p. 24].

In order to obtain new information about Ukraine, A. Yakovliv appealed to the Ukrainian Information Bureau in Lausanne, headed by V. Stepankovsky, received bulletins issued by the UPR mission in Paris and founded the Ukrainian Press Bureau in The Hague, through which he had the opportunity to telegram news from Ukraine [362, p. 24].

Information about Ukraine was sent by telegram to the Dutch press and Reuters in Amsterdam via the Ukrainian Press Bureau. Important information, such as all the notes submitted by the UPR delegation in Paris at the peace conference, A. Yakovliv printed a separate collection and sent through the press bureau to all ambassadors, ministries, magazines, the International Institute in The Hague [362, p. 25]. In addition, the magazines submitted articles on topical issues: about Ukraine and Poles, about Ukraine and Russia, about minority rights in Ukraine, about the Union of Nations, about events in Poland and Romania, also included several interviews with A. Yakovliv, published refutation of various Polish lies about Ukraine [362, p. 53].

The Dutch press treated Ukraine well and provided more information than magazines in other countries. The real information explosion in the Dutch and Belgian press was observed after the signing of the Warsaw Pact and during the Ukrainian-

Polish offensive of 1920. May 1920, -... noted, "Is it possible to believe in the sincerity of Poland towards Ukraine, which would be quite fair for Ukrainians who have proved their right to independence, and which would be very useful for the whole of Europe, if lucky to liberate Ukraine from under the Bolshevik yoke..." [360, p. 200].

In addition to the Dutch press, the diplomatic mission had contacts with the English press. On February 28, 1919, an interview with a Reuters agent was published in the Daily Telegraph and provided information about Ukraine. Despite all the measures, it was not possible to establish contacts with the Belgian press at first [362, p. 26].

Lack of funds and devaluation of foreign currency negatively affected the work of the press office [366, p. 8]. A. Yakovliv took 75,000 rubles from Kyiv and thought it was a large sum, but it turned out that this money would not be enough in the future, so he asked the ministry to allocate another 200,000 rubles as soon as possible. [362, p. 25-26].

In addition to disseminating information about Ukraine, the mission analyzed publications in European journals about events in the homeland. All information about Ukraine was registered, processed, translated and submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic [362, p. 26].

On November 25, 1919, a press bureau was established in Belgium in Liege, headed by Kislichenko, Dzhulinsky and Sichenko [367, p. 22].

The Dutch and Belgian press were interested in Ukraine's economic opportunities, as well as the state and opportunities of Ukrainian cooperation. It was noted that the latter is of interest not only in economic and financial circles, but also at the state level - in particular, the Dutch press showed the interest of the Dutch Ministry of Trade and Industry. It is also noteworthy that from time to time the Dutch press published thorough investigations into the historical past of Ukraine and the struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence. Thus, Professor I. Nirmeyer in his article in the Amsterdam magazine "Die Telegraaf" stated that on Dutch maps of Ukraine in the seventeenth - early eighteenth century. had its place, which was later deprived of Russification. The scholar not only condemned the actions of tsarist Russia, but also

contributed to the restoration of the geographical name "Ukraine" in a large atlas for Dutch schools, published in late 1919 [360, p. 200].

The head of the mission constantly stressed the need for widespread propaganda in the world. Along with reviews of Ukraine's economic situation, prospects for trade relations with European countries and, in particular, Belgium and the Netherlands, development of its natural resources, the mission's press office published historical and political-analytical materials on the Ukrainian issue in the world. During 1919–1921, the Ukrainian representation printed 9 brochures with a total circulation of 5,200 copies. in French. Among them, in particular, "Note of the UPR delegation at the Paris Peace Conference", "Ukraine, historical and political summary", "Ukrainian problem" (O. Shulgina), "Ukrainian cooperation", "Letter to Belgian deputies and senators" (with a memorandum of cooperators)) " [360, p. 206].

In addition to conducting diplomatic talks and informing the press about Ukraine, Ukrainian representatives gave lectures at educational institutions. For example, on March 23, 1920, Secretary of the Mission J. Kulischer gave a lecture on Ukraine at the People's University of Brussels "Le Tayer Intellectuel" [362, p. 20].

The UNR government, realizing the importance of culture in international relations, sent a choir to the West, led by Oleksandr Koshyts, to perform in Amsterdam, The Hague and Belgium. According to A. Yakovliv, the National Republican Chapel was extremely helpful in informing the public about Ukraine. During the performances, the choir suffered losses in the amount of 1361.96 guilders, which the head of the mission decided to cover at the expense of the press office, returning the money to the chapel [367, p. 25].

For some time, the diplomatic mission in the Netherlands has established contacts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, and Dutch officials sometimes respond: "Although the Netherlands cannot recognize Ukraine as an independent state because the Entente has not yet spoken, , any difficulties for Ukraine, its mission, because it is certain that Ukraine will be recognized, if not tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow "[367, p. 22].

On July 30, 1919, A. Yakovliv left for a meeting of ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Carlsbad. The meetings were attended by: Minister V. Temnytsky, Counselor to the Minister A. Zhuk, M. Porsche (Germany), M. Slavinsky (Czechoslovakia), A. Yakovliv (Holland, Belgium), D. Levitsky (Denmark), Counselor of the Mission in England J. Olesnytsky, Counselor of the Embassy in Austria V. Poletika, K. Lossky (Sweden, Norway), deputy. Chairman of the Mission to Finland M. Zalizniak, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Secretary of State of the Ukrainian People's Republic O. Burachynsky, J. Biberovych (Hungary, the Ukrainian People's Republic), Chairman of the Ukrainian People's Republic Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference V. Paneiko, V. Singalevich (Austria, the Ukrainian People's Republic). There were 12 meetings, which took place in the hotels "Hohenburg" and "Pupp" [368, p. 90]. Among the main issues of the meeting were the reports of Ukrainian diplomats and the analysis of the foreign policy situation in the world [361, p. 66].

Analyzing the miscalculations in the foreign policy of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the head of the Ukrainian mission in Belgium and the Netherlands A. Yakovliv linked them with the internal situation in the country. In particular, he stressed that the preconditions for the success of diplomatic activity are, among other things, "coalition and consolidation of national forces" in the Ukrainian state itself, the implementation of agrarian and economic reforms in the UPR. According to him, first of all, it was necessary to "fix the agrarian reform through the sale of land" and provide "private ownership of land", which was to become a pillar of statehood. A. Yakovliv drew attention to the interest of the Western world in trade relations with Ukraine and "concessions for the construction and operation of our wealth." He stressed that the government must ensure the inviolability of private property of foreign citizens in Ukraine.

The result of A. Yakovliv's report was the creation of a special financial and economic department at the diplomatic mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Belgium and the Netherlands. The department was to inform the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and the Ukrainian People's Republic about the financial and

economic condition of these states, about finances, products, exports and imports; take measures to organize joint banks, agencies, trade missions to establish permanent financial and economic relations between countries [359, p. 190]. On September 22, 1919, Angelo Gize, a Dutch citizen, was appointed head of the department, as well as the secretary of the mission J. Kulisher and attache M. Panasevych [360, p. 206].

The diplomatic mission was assigned not only to the Netherlands but also to Belgium. After the arrival of A. Yakovliv asked the Belgian ambassador to The Hague if he could come to Belgium and meet with Foreign Minister Paul Humans, but the ambassador told the mission that "Ukraine is not recognized as an Entente and he hopes the mission will postpone its visit to Belgium." [362, p. 22]. Belgium, as a member of the Entente, was significantly influenced by the governmental and economic circles of France, which did not recognize the independence of Ukraine [361, p. 66].

In July 1919, the head of the diplomatic mission on behalf of the UPR government appealed to the Belgian Foreign Ministry that the Ukrainian government recognize the public debts of the former Russian Empire and assume their payment in the part that belongs to Ukraine. J. Popenko notes that this declaration was adopted very favorably. The relevant memorandum was published in the local press. At the same time, the head of the Ukrainian mission asked the Ukrainian government what the mission should do in this direction: "We have no authority or instructions here abroad." But the diplomatic mission did not receive any instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic for the practical implementation of this memorandum [359, p. 191].

Only a year later, on March 3, 1920, A. Yakovliv received an invitation to meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium [367, p. 28]. On March 8, he met with P. Humans, during which A. Yakovliv presented a letter of credence signed by members of the Directory on January 5, 1919, and prepared by him "Memorandum on the international position of Ukraine in connection with its current situation" and a copy memorandum of Ukrainian cooperative organizations abroad [360, p. 205]. The diplomat was helped to meet with the minister by a Ukrainian citizen living in Brussels, engineer Boris Vulbrun, who had connections among influential circles in Belgium.

For this he was seconded to the mission as a technical and commercial attache without pay, out of state and was issued a diplomatic passport [367, p. 30]. According to J. Popenko, thanks to this meeting the Ukrainian mission was recognized, de facto, as the representation of the UPR in Belgium [361, p. 66]. V. Solovyova believes that the permission to open a diplomatic mission in Belgium is dictated by the need to strengthen trade and economic ties between Ukraine and Belgium [360, p. 200]. At that time, Belgian entrepreneurs in Ukraine had 80% of the capital invested in the industry of the former Russian Empire. This created real conditions for the recognition of Ukraine by Belgium at an earlier date than other Entente countries [350, p. 204].

The head of the diplomatic mission decided to move part of the mission and the press office to Brussels. In The Hague remained A.-G. Varkentyn, a government official of M. Tikhomirov, a government official of Giza's press office, the head of the mission A. Yakovliv, secretary J. Kulisher and government official G. Ver-Elst (Belgian) and a forwarder of the press office of B. Chornyι went to Brussels. The consular department and the general chancellery remained in The Hague [367, p. 28].

According to government officials, the internal problems in Belgium between the Belgian Flemings and the Belgian Walloons were similar to the confrontation between Ukrainians and Russians. Not the least role in shaping the negative image of the UPR was played by Russian and Polish representatives, which is why Belgian government circles perceived Ukraine as a "German intrigue." Attitudes toward the Ukrainian mission and the UPR as a whole changed after the signing of the Ukrainian-Polish treaty on April 21, 1920, under which Poland recognized the independence of the UPR. According to A. Yakovliv, "we, in Belgium, are definitely supported by all political parties and groups. Even the Socialists, who sympathize with the Soviets but are still nationalists, are still behind us. In the Netherlands, we are also treated favorably, with the exception of the Dutch Communists, who are especially for the Bolsheviks " [362, p. 34].

Realizing that the Belgian government does not recognize Ukraine's independence, Ukrainian diplomats paid special attention to information about the possibility of economic cooperation between the countries. In 1920, brochures and

bulletins on the possibilities of economic cooperation with the Ukrainian People's Republic were published and distributed in the Netherlands and Belgium. In 1920 The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Belgium and the Netherlands have repeatedly inquired about the possibility of importing Ukrainian bread. Economic projects of Ukrainian-Belgian and Ukrainian-Dutch trade groups on the supply and exchange of goods between the states were drawn up. However, neither the Ukrainian government nor the cooperatives responded to these proposals in a timely manner. Time was lost, and with it the opportunity to establish practical relations in the international arena [361, p. 67].

Analyzing the economic situation in the Netherlands, A. Yakovliv draws attention to the fact that during the war a large number of ships were requisitioned by the Entente, which led to the decline of trade. Holland needs bread, and for bread it will give everything it has, and in addition can help politically [362, p. 28]. In 1920, several large Rotterdam shipping companies approached the UPR mission with a proposal to establish a Rotterdam-Odesa transport line to establish trade relations, subject to the liberation of Odessa from the Bolsheviks. At that time, the Netherlands ranked third in the world after the United States and Great Britain in the number of steamships. Belgian industrial circles were also interested in economic cooperation. Special economic programs were developed for possible trade between countries. The Ukrainian government did not even need to send a separate economic representative, as Ukrainian cooperators and procurement commissions were permanently based in Vienna and Berlin. However, the requests of diplomats, as well as previous ones, remained unanswered [361 p. 67].

In addition to political and economic issues, the mission sought to establish military cooperation. The head of the mission had very good relations with the Minister of War P. Johnson. A. Yakovliv offered to hire qualified Belgian instructors-officers for the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, who received a small salary in Belgium. The Belgian military uniform is similar to the Ukrainian one, which was adopted during the Central Rada, so it can be purchased, as well as other necessary things for the army [362, p. 35].

From August 1, 1920, a military mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which had moved from Warsaw, worked in Belgium for a year, consisting of Ataman O. Osetsky, head of the mission, Colonel Pilenko, adviser, and Captain Didunik, secretary. The mission was authorized not only by the Ministry of Military Affairs, but also by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The military mission worked closely with the diplomatic mission and its head [362, p. 60]. The main purpose of its activities was the purchase of weapons and military equipment (tractors, tractors, cars, etc.) for the armed forces. However, due to lack of funds, she was actually unable to fulfill the task set before her and was liquidated, transferring her property to the Ministry of Military Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic [360, p. 208].

On April 25, 1920, an international socialist conference opened in Amsterdam, which was attended by representatives of Ukraine P.P. Matyushenko, I. Didushok. During its work, for 5 days, the conference addressed many issues, including territorial issues of recognition of the independence of some new states. The conference called for recognition of the independence of Finland, Estonia and Georgia. As for Ukraine, the representatives of the Dutch, Belgian, Irish, and Swedish socialist parties voted in favor of the UPR, while the French (Langett), English (MacDonald), German (The Hague), Polish, and Russian (Sukhomlin) representatives voted against. The conference decided to recognize Ukraine's independence as soon as the Ukrainian population speaks on this issue. A. Yakovliv organized representatives of the press to cover the Ukrainian issue at the conference, but P. Matyushenko, I. Didushok did not contact him [362, p. 28-29].

While staying in Belgium on May 17, 1920 in connection with Poland's recognition of Ukraine's independence, A. Yakovliv sent Second Secretary J. Kulisher to the Foreign Minister with a report persuading the Minister to send UPR representatives to conferences in Spa and Brussels. The head of the Ukrainian mission proposes to submit a declaration of recognition of Ukraine to the Spa conference. At a financial conference in Brussels, A. Yakovliv proposes to submit a detailed memorandum on the economic importance of Ukraine for Europe. To prepare for the participation of the UPR delegation, he proposed Ambassador to Germany M. Porsche

and Minister of Finance B. Martos to convene a conference of Ukrainian representatives: diplomatic, financial, economic and cooperators to draw up a comprehensive memorandum. If necessary, agreed to draw up a memorandum, with the appropriate powers [362, p. 33]. Also, the head of the diplomatic mission proposes to allow him to submit a declaration to the Supreme Council of the Entente on the recognition of part of the public debt of former Russia, recognition of concessions for foreigners and compensation for war during conferences in Spa and Brussels [362, p. 34], but did not receive answers from any of them.

From July 5 to 16, 1920, a conference of Entente representatives was held with the participation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany at the Belgian Spa. On the eve of the conference, June 26, 1920 in Proskuriv, at a meeting of the Council of People's Ministers, a delegation was approved for a conference at the Spa. The head of the delegation was appointed Ambassador - Count M. Tyszkiewicz, members - ambassadors: in London - A. Margolin, in Belgium - A. Yakovliv and in Switzerland - Baron M. Vasilko - all with the right to vote [369, p. 83]. But the Ukrainian delegation was not invited to the conference, so the Ukrainian delegation consisting of diplomats A. Yakovliv, M. Vasylo and others. did not take part in its official part [369, p. 691]. The conference was used to establish contacts with foreign diplomats and discuss the Ukrainian issue at an informal level.

In September 1920, a financial conference was held in Brussels under the auspices of the League of Nations. A. Yakovliv headed the delegation, which included O. Daskolyuk and V. Tymoshenko. The Ukrainian diplomat, through a mission in London, asked the General Secretariat of the League of Nations to include the UPR delegation in the conference on the rights of delegations of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, which are not members of the League of Nations [370, p. 301]. On September 9, the conference's organizing committee announced that "according to the instructions, it is not authorized to include the Ukrainian delegation in the conference." Having received this answer, the head of the delegation addressed the President of the Conference Mr. Ador for the second time, emphasizing the role of Ukraine in providing food for Europe during the war and wishing that the conference be asked to allow the

Ukrainian delegation an advisory vote. which Estonia, Latvia and Armenia had. However, President Mr. Ador refused, arguing that the composition of the conference is determined by the Council of the League of Nations, not the conference [362, p. 68]. On September 20, A. Yakovliv submitted a memorandum in five copies to the conference and sent it to all participants, representatives of the world press and representatives of various financial and economic circles. A total of 1,000 copies of the memorandum were published, 500 of which were distributed at the conference [362, p. 69]. Regarding the memorandum, the conference took note of it. The positive consequence of participating in the conference was that the delegation gained certain semi-official rights, which eventually gave the opportunity to attend all meetings of the conference and received all the documents of the conference [370, p. 302]. Thus, the conference in Brussels, as well as the previous one - in Spa, had no practical consequences for the recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty.

Difficulties in the work of the mission arose due to the lack of material resources, which were not enough to maintain the diplomatic mission, the press office, to pay the mission staff and freelancers. A. Yakovliv repeatedly appealed to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance for financial assistance. The funds received by the UPR Representation in Belgium and the Netherlands from the issuance and renewal of passports, certificates, visas and inscriptions on documents were insufficient. Funding decreased with the deterioration of the UPR and the loss of territory and, as a consequence, sources of funding. At a conference of ambassadors and heads of missions held in August 1920 in Vienna, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic announced a plan to reduce the staff of diplomatic missions. The diplomatic mission to the Netherlands and Belgium was reduced to three (head of the mission - A. Yakovliv, secretary - A.-G. Varkentin and attache - J. Kulisher). A. Yakovliv did not receive an order to second government officials who remained out of state, and they continued to perform their duties in the mission and the press office, for which they were paid. A total of 4,200 guilders were allocated for the maintenance of the mission for a month - from September 1, 1920, which in September 1920 the diplomatic mission did not receive. Prior to that, the mission's monthly budget

was 7,937 guilders. Expenditures are thus reduced by about 46%. A. Yakovliv decided to use for the needs of the mission the funds it received from the passport fee [370, p. 308], constantly increasing the size for the services provided [367, p. 39].

On December 30, 1920, in view of the reduction of the mission staff and the non-receipt of funds for the organization of the press bureau, the head of the mission issued an order dismissing freelance officials from January 1, 1921, Mrs. Gize and Mr. Black, paying them a passport fee. for the month of December, government G. Ver-Elst [367, p. 40]. On January 1, 1921, M. Tikhomirov left the mission in connection with the reduction of the staff of the mission and the end of his studies in Vienna [367, p. 40,366].

From January 1, 1921, the mission worked only on the proceeds from the passport fee, 2.5 thousand guilders, which were allocated by Minister M. Vasilko, and at the personal expense of A. Yakovliv. In his inquiries to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 4 and 28, June 9, and September 3, 1921, the head of the mission asked to resume funding or order the closure of the mission, but received no response [361, p. 68].

Unable to keep the mission room from 3 rooms, A. Yakovliv was forced to reduce it to 1. Due to the fact that M. Vasyenko did not pay the appropriate funds for six months, the head of the mission sent government officials to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic [360, p. 209].

On January 12, 1921, A. Yakovliv addressed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic with a report on relations in the Netherlands and Belgium with Ukraine, in which he reported on the coverage of this issue in the press. Most often, reports of a military nature were published, about the actions of the Bolsheviks on the territory of Ukraine, but very rarely information was published about the need for an independent Ukraine, a national government, and material and natural resources. A. Yakovliv proposed to move from word to deed, to offer Europe something more real than just simple evidence, no matter how convincing they were about the fact that Ukraine has the right to its state [371, p. 2].

According to A. Yakovliv, the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic was "too idealistic, they thought that if we prove our right with arguments, we will be recognized" [371, p. 2]. It was necessary to take into account the experience of Czechoslovakia, which passed a law to pay the Entente deficit of 750 million francs in gold for the independence of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, who sold their forests and other concessions to England, which recognized and supported them everywhere [371, p. 2].

A. Yakovliv proposes to take real measures that would help strengthen Ukraine's international position, namely:

1) what concessions the government can transfer to foreign capital; 2) what and for what amount of orders for materials for the reconstruction of the region and goods for the population; 3) what benefits and privileges it can give to foreign capitalists; 4) how much and in which industries you need to invest foreign capital; 5) what loans the government can take abroad; 6) how much grain, raw materials can be sold; 7) how much money can be given to Ukraine to compensate for the losses caused by the war to foreign owners and to pay part of Russia's debts due to Ukraine. All proposals must be approved by the Council of Ministers and approved by the supreme power [371, p. 2]. He also recommended the creation of an extraordinary delegation of the most competent and responsible persons (for example: the Chairman of the Council of Ministers or his Deputy, Ministers: Foreign Affairs, Finance, National Economy, Military or other representatives of the army). The delegation was tasked with visiting the main centers of Europe (London, Paris, Berlin), negotiating not so much with officials - ministers or their representatives, but with people of capital - industrialists and bankers who made real politics in Europe, to offer them certain real benefits for the recognition of Ukraine, for the support of its national government, for aid with money, weapons, for support in the resolute struggle against Soviet Russia. A. Yakovliv was convinced that such a delegation would do a lot and achieve real results. An example to follow was the leadership of Poland, Romania, Latvia, which visited all the Entente states several times [371, p. 3].

A. Yakovliv believed that the main way that can promote Ukraine's independence is to establish economic ties with European countries, he noted that "we are too weak politically to form the political combination we need, to expect that one or another combination, which is formed without our direct influence, something can give us under certain conditions, it is both uncertain and dangerous, because when we do not have the strength to influence the combination, it thus does not depend on us and can turn against us, as has happened more than once" [50, p. 3 stars]. In his opinion, the hope for an Anglo-German combination, or the Black Sea, or some other, not only will not give anything in our weakness, but on the contrary may, against our will, make us the object of sale or exploitation, as usual, but grandiose and very attractive "concession" [371, p. 3].

On March 14, 1921, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to A. Yakovliv's proposal that the Council of Ministers had approved a memorandum by I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky on the plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine entitled "Ukraine and Europe." On March 30, 1921, the diplomat informed the ministry that he had read the document, but stressed the need for decisive action: "one should not wait until someone is interested in him." He also noted that in Europe the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic began to be forgotten, as most European countries accepted the fact of the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet government and established official diplomatic relations with it [361, p. 69]. The diplomat reiterated the need for an urgent departure of a special ministerial delegation abroad to the Entente states, which would be authorized to sign specific agreements with representatives of industrial, financial, trade and official circles in Europe. Only in this way the governments of both leading European countries and Belgium and the Netherlands could recognize the independence of Ukraine [359, p. 195].

On September 16, 1921, A. Yakovliv addressed the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Nikovsky with a report on the activities of the mission for more than a year and a half, in which he argued that the mission's stay in Holland and Belgium could not have positive consequences in diplomatic affairs. recognition of Ukraine's independence. This is hindered by local reasons. During the war, the Netherlands pursued a neutral

policy and tried to maintain friendly relations with both the Entente and the Central Powers. It has always avoided taking independent steps that would contradict the policy of "big" states, the Netherlands can not recognize Ukraine until it is recognized by other countries, especially the Entente [372, p. 8]. Belgium is an Entente state, France has a great influence on its foreign policy, it has widespread sympathy for Poland, with which Ukraine has long had hostile relations [372, p. 11]. One of the reasons for closing the mission, according to A. Yakovliv - is insufficient funding, despite the fact that the mission staff was reduced in 1920. The deficit on the mission on June 1, 1921 was 8236 guilders 90 cents [372, p. 59]. At that time, the mission included A. Yakovliv - head of the mission, secretary A.-G. Varkentin - for the Netherlands and J. Kulisher for Belgium [372, p. 17].

On October 10, 1921, in a letter to A. Yakovliv, Minister A. Nikovsky thanked the representatives of the mission for their work and said that the only way out was to close the mission, because finding a financial source in our current difficult financial situation was not possible." [372, p. 59-59]. The diplomat did not receive an official order to liquidate the mission.

On February 14, 1922, A. Yakovliv again appealed to the Minister for financial support, hoping for the help of cooperators, who promised to allocate 30,000 francs to support the mission [372, p. 210]. He points out that during 1921 the mission did not receive any sums from the UPR government, the deficit of the mission was more than 13 thousand guilders [372, p. 99]. The debt to A. Yakovliv, as the head of the mission, in Belgium and the Netherlands in 1921 amounted to 5771 guilders [364, p. 21]. From November 1920 he did not receive a salary. Under such conditions, he informs the Minister that he will close the mission in the Netherlands on March 1, he will be able to work in Belgium if he receives funds from cooperators [372, p. 99].

On February 20, 1922, A. Yakovliv sent notes to the Foreign Ministries of Belgium and the Netherlands, in which he protested against X. Rakovsky's illegal representation of Ukraine's interests at the Genoa Conference. The documents were accepted, but there was no answer to them. Thus, European countries actually recognized the Ukrainian Soviet government [361, p. 70].

On April 1, 1922, A. Yakovliv was forced to close the mission of the mission in Holland and unite all the affairs of the mission in Brussels [372, p. 212].

On April 2-4, 1922, an international conference was held in Berlin.

E. Vandervelde, a representative of the Socialist Party of Belgium, submitted a proposal to the government of Soviet Russia demanding "recognition of the full right to self-determination" of Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia. However, the proposal was not considered. However, the fact itself was evidence that some Belgian political circles did not give up the idea of supporting the sovereignty of the UNR [361, p. 70].

On June 26, 1922, A. Yakovliv again appealed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic and informed him that: , and not just to keep the mission ", he noted that he will be forced to close the mission in Brussels on August 1 [372, p. 213].

On July 7, 1922, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic sent a letter to A. Yakovliv, in which it assured that the funds would be sent in the coming days and that the mission should not be liquidated. The funds were not received, so A. Yakovliv was forced to close the diplomatic mission in Brussels [372, p. 213].

In August 1922, the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic instructed Mr. A. Yakovliv, Plenipotentiary Minister, Head of the Diplomatic Mission to the Netherlands and Belgium, to enter into negotiations with Belgian financiers and industrialists to establish the size and form of participation of Belgian Belgium loan to the UPR. A. Yakovliv is also negotiating with representatives of the "Committee for the Protection of Belgian Interests in Russia." The total amount of Belgian claims against Russia was 4 billion.gold francs, Ukraine accounted for 1 billion 812 million francs (52%) according to the memorandum of the Belgian delegation to the Genoa Conference. According to A. Yakovliv, the figures are inflated by Belgian industrialists [373, p. 10].

A. Yakovliv, as a diplomatic representative of the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, was to inform the interested Belgian citizens and institutions that

the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic is based on ensuring the private property rights of both Ukrainian citizens and foreigners.

At the same time, A. Yakovliv had to emphasize that the negotiations would take effect if the exile government of the Ukrainian People's Republic returned to the territory of Ukraine, ie Belgium had to officially support it. However, first, the Belgian government did not see any real benefit in negotiating with the UPR government in exile, as the latter could not provide any real guarantees; secondly, in the absence of funding and closure of the diplomatic mission A. Yakovliv could not actually negotiate [361, p. 68].

With the termination of the diplomatic mission in Belgium, its functions of protecting the interests of Ukrainians and fighting for the idea of Ukraine's independence are transferred to the Branch of the Ukrainian National Union in Belgium, headed by A. Yakovliv. On January 22, the UNS Branch holds a meeting dedicated to the 5th anniversary of the proclamation of the UPR as an independent state. The activities of the UNS Branch and the UPR diplomatic mission established two Ukrainian communities - in Liege and Leuven, and a central union of these communities was organized in Brussels [374, p. 1].

At the same time, the activities of the Ukrainian missions helped the UPR to break out of the hostile circle and helped to establish various ties with the countries of Europe and the world. It influenced the fact that Western politicians began to take a more realistic approach to the fact of Ukraine's existence as a modern state and the establishment of political and economic relations with it. Thanks to the actions of Ukrainian diplomacy in Western Europe, the public of these countries, many politicians realized that Ukrainian statehood is an extremely important factor in maintaining political balance in the region and Europe before Russian pressure, as well as protecting Russia's independent neighbors. Therefore, due to this circumstance, Ukrainian diplomatic missions were able to continue their activities even after the defeat of the national liberation struggle in Ukraine, using every opportunity to establish the idea of Ukrainian independence in the world.