

10.46299/979-8-88831-920-8.6

6. Political and legal development of ethnic minorities of right bank Ukraine during the Ukrainian revolution

Annotation

The regional peculiarities of the process of politicization of social and legal development of ethnic minorities in Right Bank Ukraine are analyzed. Forms, methods and means of implementation of the programs of political parties and public organizations of ethnic minorities in the territory of the Right Bank provinces on the eve and during the Ukrainian revolution are traced. The author considered the legal approaches of the political forces of the ethnic minorities of the Right Bank in solving the issue of international relations during the years of the struggle for Ukrainian statehood, the influence of foreign policy factors on the formation of national demands of political parties and public organizations.

It is proved that the politicization of public life in the processes of inter-ethnic relations, the adoption of the law on national-personal autonomy by the Ukrainian Central Rada received a positive assessment from ethnic minorities and active support from their national political parties and organizations.

6.1 Parties and public organizations of ethnic minorities of the Right Bank of Ukraine in the conditions of the crisis of the russian autocracy

Complex social and political events caused by the First World War and the policy of the Russian autocracy became the reason for the intensification of the public activity of the national minorities of the Right Bank.

On the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917, Russians on the Right Bank took an active part in the formation of national political parties, public organizations, educational centers, etc. Instead, the democratic freedoms proclaimed by the revolution gave the Russian movement new qualitative indicators.

At the beginning of 1917, the political views of Russians in Ukraine split into two directions. One part actively supported the policy of the Provisional Government, and the other - the Bolsheviks. At the All-Ukrainian National Congress, lawyer and public figure D. Hryhorovych-Barsky spoke on behalf of the party of Russian constitutional democrats in such a way that his party has a clear understanding that the Russian state is waiting for such a reorganization that would meet all the political demands of individual nationalities [110, pp. 47–48]. The Russian Party of Cadets noted that the democratic republican governance reform that was taking shape in Russia cannot be based on those forms of local life that have developed in Russia over the past decades. The cadet program envisaged two ways out of the existing situation, but both were unacceptable for the cadets. The first is the path of immediate federalization, which "required such a strain of forces that it is unlikely to be able to withstand in this terrible time. The second - a return to the old forms of state power - looked no less possible." The real course of life spoke about this. Cadets believed that the All-Russian Congress would have to solve two issues at once: "on the one hand, to preserve the unity and strength of the Russian state, on the other hand, to ensure the national free life of Russians who are part of our democracy and their broad identity" [111, p. 74–75].

The best way out of the situation was considered by national newspapers to be introduced by the Constituent Assembly of local provincial, that is, territorial autonomy, and the expansion of local self-government rights. Actually, it was about replacing national autonomy with local self-government. In his closing speech at the congress, the speaker absolutely frankly stated that the issue of the federation should not be confused with the national issue. The expansion of local self-government is already a huge concession to nationalities.

A similar formulation of the question caused a discussion at the cadet congress. In particular, the delegates who came from Ukraine tried to convince the Congress of the inadequacy of the proposed solutions. Thus, M. Mohylyanskyi believed that the rights of Russians can be adequately ensured only by turning the Russian Empire into a federal republic. He noted that when the People's Freedom Party does not include the demands of national-territorial autonomy in its program, "it will become impossible

for Ukrainians to support this party." M. Mohylyanskyi's speech was echoed by the speeches of Kyiv delegate Butenko and Poltava H. Inshanetskyi. However, these speakers failed to influence the position of the congress. The Cadets were never able to abandon the idea of preserving a unitary Russia [111, pp. 84–85].

On the brink of the collapse of the Russian Empire, the leader of the Cadet Party, P. Milyukov, noted: "The preservation of the state unity of Russia is the limit by which the ultimate decision of the party is dictated. The breakdown of the state into sovereign independent units is absolutely impossible for her. Such a statement of the question may not entirely coincide with the aspirations of some Russian nationalities. We know very well that some of the Russian nationalities seem to be going further, striving for the creation of a national-territorial association, the competences of which they imagine to be broader than the Central Committee of the Party imagines them" [111, pp. 93–94].

The Russian Mensheviks in Right Bank Ukraine found themselves in a difficult situation that they created for themselves. Understanding the scope of the Ukrainian movement on the eve of the Ukrainian revolution, on the one hand, being Marxists on the other, and being a Russian political party on the other, it was difficult for them to stick to a single political course. The resolution of the Kyiv regional congress of the RSDLP(m)* (at the beginning of 1917) recognized that it was impossible to maintain Russian centralism and proposed a democratic republic, but not a federal one, but with "recognition of regions that differ in ethnographic and cultural and economic features, rights to autonomy with its own representative assembly, preserving the unity of Russia as a state-economic mechanism." Such a state system, where there is both autonomy and a united Russia, the Mensheviks believed, "will fully ensure the adaptation of state forms to individual regions to their peculiarities and guarantee their population the possibility of the widest possible cultural and national development" [112, pp. 62–64].

Among the Mensheviks on the Right Bank on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution, everything also came down to satisfying national and cultural requirements. But in the

* The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) was formed in March 1898. In Ukraine, the RSDLP was represented mainly by Mensheviks (RSDLP(m)), whose ideas were close to Western social democrats.

same resolution we find another warning against bourgeois-nationalist aspirations, which complicate the tasks of the revolution, darken the class consciousness of the proletariat and threaten its unity. Proletarian internationalism and the need to identify class contradictions within each nation are also mentioned here. Any national autonomy not related to Russia was considered an anarchic manifestation.

Similar principles were professed by the party of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries^{**}. She recognized that the interests of the nation are best served by a federal republic, but this idea did not develop further, because continuous reservations began: "national-territorial autonomy is appropriate only if there is a sufficient internal organization of a given nation and if the working people (the proletariat and the working peasantry) are fundamentally satisfied. This last circumstance is decisive in the question of a federal republic, since the party fights only for a democratic federal republic and points to the danger of the birth of small bourgeois republics, which is possible due to the weak organization of the working class and the expected increased activity of the bourgeoisie" [113, pp. 13-14].

Russian political parties on the Right Bank have made maximum efforts, agitating and promoting the preservation of the unity of Russia. Such political positions of Russians are usual, because, living in Ukraine, they never associated themselves with national minorities and even had a prejudiced attitude towards the problems of the latter. As the historian D. Doroshenko emphasizes, these were all elements that got along with Russian culture, grew up in it, cherished it, were adopted by all-Russian patriotism, and shared all-Russian ideological aspirations. Accordingly, by the Russian minority, the researcher understood "the population of most cities, which consisted of mixed Ukrainians with an admixture of real Russians who were in Ukraine as government officials, soldiers, merchants, and workers" [114, pp. 144–145]. Based on data from the newspaper "Volyn", on the eve of the Ukrainian revolution, Russian

^{**} The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, Socialist Revolutionaries (S.R. - hence SRs) is a Russian political party, formed in 1901 and originating from the public movement of populism, a direction that expressed the interests of peasant democracy, combining radical-bourgeois-democratic and anti-serfism programs with the ideas of utopian socialism.

political parties of a wide ideological and political spectrum operated in the territory of the Volyn province [115].

In the State Archives of the Zhytomyr region, you can find information that most of the names of Russian organizations have names such as "Volyn Committee of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries" or "Volyn Department of the Party of People's Freedom" or "Zhytomyr Group of the RSDLP." [116, ark. 130]. Thus indicating, so to speak, its subsidiary status and dependence in actions from the main party branch in Petrograd or Kyiv. This status played its role in the preparation and speed of reactions of party cells in Volyn on the eve of the dynamic events of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921.

In general, none of the Russian democratic parties was able to openly recognize the Ukrainian people's right to independent life, at least in the form of national-territorial autonomy as part of federal-democratic Russia. This was especially evident on the Right Bank, where the positions of the Ukrainian movement were the strongest. Each of the parties put forward their own reasons, which, in their opinion, did not allow Ukraine to self-determine: this is the state of war in which Russia was, and the need for a decision of the Constituent Assembly, and the fear of covering up class problems with national problems. In general, behind the political views of the Russian minority was a very real interest - not to lose Ukraine and such a strategically important region as the Right Bank, under no circumstances to allow Ukrainians to become full owners of their land.

Unlike the Russian one, the Jewish socio-political movement on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution was illegal. The public life of the Jewish ethnic minority of the Right Bank was closely related to the limited freedom of movement of Jews on the territory of Ukraine and to constant national oppression in everyday life.

This restriction, which usually applied only to criminals, was applied by current law to the Jewish nation of more than five million (within the borders of Russia). Jews were allowed to live in the following provinces: Kingdom of Poland, Bessarabian Province, Vilna, Vitebsk, Volyn, Grodno, Katerynoslav, Kyiv (except Kyiv City), Kovno, Minsk, Mogilev, Podil, Poltava, Tavria (except Sevastopol and Yalta),

Kherson, Chernihivska, i.e. in the so-called "settlement strip"* . According to the researcher V. Orlyanskyi, the "settlement strip" in the form in which it existed at the beginning of the 20th century had the appearance of a special ghetto for Jews who were concentrated in cities and towns [117, pp. 117–118].

The tsarist government also added an economic motive to the religious considerations regarding the "strip of settlement" and the Jewish question in general - the "exploitation" of the indigenous population by the Jews, and from the beginning of the 20th century. - the motive is political: the active participation of Jews in the revolutionary movement. The Jewish population, in addition to restrictions in the territory of the settlement, also used "special rules" in other spheres of life, included in almost every volume of the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire. These rules were constantly changing depending on one or another political course, the personal attitude of the emperor [118, pp. 19–20].

Despite all the oppression from the Russian administration, Jewish parties on the eve of the Ukrainian revolution were a powerful political force and showed the greatest activity compared to other national minorities of Right Bank Ukraine.

One of the most influential Jewish parties in Ukraine was the Bund**, whose numbers grew significantly in the winter of 1917. The program of the Bund on the national issue established the following requirements: a united and indivisible Russia, for each nationality the right to free development, i.e. the equality of the languages of national minorities, the autonomy of territories that differ in their economic, national and everyday features. Arkady Kremer is considered the ideologist of this political force. The central printed organ became the newspaper "Arbaiter Shtimme", which at the beginning of the 20th century. replaced "Der Bund" [119, pp. 104–105].

* The settlement strip (existed in 1791–1917 with changes in 1829 and 1835) is an area of compact Jewish settlement in the Russian Empire, designated by the tsarist government in order to prevent their penetration into the Great Russian provinces and protect Russian entrepreneurship from Jewish competition.

** The Bund is a Jewish socialist organization formed in October 1897 in Vilnius. After the February Revolution, the Bund supported the Provisional Government and the autonomy of Ukraine. In March 1921, the Bund self-liquidated in Soviet Russia and the USSR, but continued its activities in Poland, and later in the United States.

At the initial stages, the Bund did not put forward demands for the achievement of national rights, it was believed that all class problems would disappear after the victory of the proletariat in the class struggle. Over time, the party leadership developed a program of national and cultural autonomy. This caused a sharp negative reaction from the Bolsheviks led by V. Lenin. Their position was based on the denial of the existence of the Jewish nation, since the Jews, who were scattered throughout the world, did not have a common language and territory. Therefore, in accordance with the outlined logic, the only way out for the Jews was assimilation [120, pp. 27–28].

On the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution, the Socialist Jewish Labor Party held a party conference at which the main current tasks were formulated. Among these, the conference included: the guarantee of the rights of national minorities, the recognition of minorities' right to national-personal autonomy, which, among other things, the party recognized as one of the necessary conditions for the successful class struggle of the Jewish proletariat [121, ark. 48].

In addition to political parties, public urban communities, religious organizations, and cultural and educational societies were active in the Jewish environment.

In 1914, the Jewish Committee for Aid to Victims of War (ECJV) was established, the main role in which was played by the Kyiv Department of Aid to Jews (KVDE). The committee helped not only the victims of the war itself, but also Jewish refugees and those evicted "for security reasons." Thanks to extensive connections, the ECJV received help from the Society of Handicrafts, the Jewish Colonization Society, Jewish communities of various countries, etc. EKZHV helped refugees settle on the Right Bank, provided them with food and clothing, provided medical assistance, helped them find work, and undergo retraining [122, pp. 44–45]. The TRP was created in 1880 to encourage Jews to work in skilled crafts and agriculture. In 1906, it received legal status. After the First World War, the TRP became a worldwide organization.

Also in 1905, the Union for the Equality of Russian Jews, most of whom lived on the Right Bank, was founded. The leaders of the union considered their main task to be the organization of purposeful influence on the public opinion of the country. After

the pogroms, the Union decided to convene the All-Russian Jewish National Assembly, which would lead the struggle for Jewish equality in the Russian Empire.

However, the Russian government continued to persecute Jewish parties and public organizations until 1917. The police paid the greatest attention to the Bund, which was banned for its social democratic views, and various currents of political Zionism. The police administration was well versed in the affairs of the Jewish political parties, which had the most extensive structure in the right-bank provinces. The Russian government hoped to use the Zionist movement to divert Jewish youth from participating in revolutionary organizations and transform their dissatisfaction with social discrimination into activities outside the empire.

The next largest on the Right Bank was the Polish ethnic minority. Accordingly, in the political arena, it was inferior to the Russians, Jews and Ukrainians, but significantly ahead of the Czechs and Germans, who almost did not participate in the social and political movement in Right-Bank Ukraine on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, the policy of police repression and oppression reduced the activity of the Polish community, led to the absence of legal active organizations and movements. The result of adaptation to new conditions was the spread of ideas of positivism in society and the implementation of the slogans of "organic work". They envisaged painstaking work for the creation of material goods, the struggle for the survival of the Polish nation, for the rise of Polish culture, and the development of all branches of the economy. These ideas were picked up, first of all, by the landowners, the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia. This is how the conservative direction of the Polish socio-political movement was formed [123, pp. 179–181].

Also, in contrast to the conservative one, a radical direction of the Polish social movement is emerging, represented by populist, socialist and social democratic currents. Proponents of this trend on the Right Bank were mostly Poles in Volyn - people from the middle and small nobility, who had an influence on the workers.

Legal, semi-legal or illegal branches of many political parties and organizations of various directions operated in it for a more or less long time - from the People's

Democrats (Endeks)* to the Polish Military Organization (POW) founded by Józef Piłsudski and two socialist parties - the "Polish Socialist Party" (PPS)** and "Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania" (SDKPL)*** (the latter took more radical positions) [124, pp. 93–98]. On the eve of the Ukrainian revolution on the Right Bank, the strongest positions among the Polish national minority were held by Polish nationalist organizations - the People's League, the Union of Polish Youth and the Polish National Democratic Party [125, ark. 162–164].

Sometimes political cells with a conspiratorial purpose called themselves local (that is, political parties or associations formed and operating in Ukraine), although there were indeed local ones among them, which set themselves the goal of protecting the interests of the Polish national minority in Right-Bank Ukraine. The activities of 37 Polish deputies, who were united in a faction called "Polish Circle", during the work of the First State Duma, testifies to their other political intentions. This faction joined the Union of Autonomists, which dealt with the affairs of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Empire. It was headed by the Pole R. Lednytskyi. The "Polish Circle" submitted a declaration on the autonomy of Poland to the State Duma [126, pp. 49–52].

The "Polish circle" of the Second State Duma included 32 deputies. It was not possible to create the Union of Autonomists in this Duma because of the position of some Polish deputies who advocated the autonomy of Poland not in ethnographic, but in historical borders, i.e. from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, i.e. including Right Bank Ukraine. After the defeat of the revolution of 1905–1907, researchers note, when on June 3, 1907, a new election law was issued that limited the representation of Poles in

* Endeky (abbr. from the initials Narodowa Demokracja - national democracy (ND)) is the everyday name of ideologically related Polish nationalist organizations - the Polish League (1887–1893), the People's League (1893–1928), the Union of Polish Youth (ZET) , 1887–1918, with interruptions), the National Democratic Party (1897–1945), certain immigrant groups (after 1945).

** The Polish Socialist Party or the Polish Party of Socialists (PPS) (Polish: Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS)) is a Polish party that existed in 1892–1948 and aimed to create an independent Polish republic. In November 1906, the party split into two parts: the PPS-Left adopted an internationalist platform, and the PPS-Revolutionary led by Józef Piłsudski began to adhere to nationalist ideas.

*** Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPL) (Polish: Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy) is a social democratic, Marxist Polish party that was founded in July 1893.

the Duma, therefore only 14, and not 37 Polish deputies were elected to the Third State Duma [126, pp. 58–61].

The programs of the vast majority of political associations were imbued with the Polish national liberation and statist idea, and had a pan-Polish focus [127, ark. 5–7].

The revolutionary events in Warsaw, the armed uprising in Łódź on June 21–25, 1905 had a powerful impact on the public position of the Poles of Right Bank Ukraine. Under such conditions, tsarism was forced to make certain concessions. In April 1905, the law "On strengthening the foundations of religious tolerance" was approved, which formally proclaimed freedom of religion and restored some rights to Roman Catholic priests. The authorities allowed the collection of funds for the construction of the second church in Kyiv, named in honor of the emperor Mykolaivsky, according to the project of V. Horodetskyi [128, pp. 37–38].

In the fall of 1905, Poles took part in an all-Russian political strike, advocating an amnesty for political prisoners, an 8-hour workday, and democratic freedoms. They perceived the Manifesto of October 17 in different ways: some believed that the goals had been achieved, while others, in particular the Endeks, called for the continuation of the struggle for autonomy. Taking advantage of certain concessions, Polish communities created the "Polish House" in Lutsk (1906), the "Brotherly Help" society in Uman (1906), dozens of Roman Catholic circles throughout the Right Bank and especially in Volyn. However, these institutions, societies, and associations did not last long, as anti-Polish forces became more active in the conditions of the offensive of the reaction and new prohibitions arose [129, pp. 165–167].

Note that Right Bank Ukraine, among other regions of the empire, did without elected local authorities - zemstvos - for the longest time. Only in 1911 did these institutions begin to be established on the Right Bank. This is explained by the specificity of the ethnopolitics of the Russian Empire in this region - the Russian autocracy feared the influx of Poles into the zemstvo institutions, believing that this would contribute to the spread of separatist ideas among the local population [130, pp. 106].

Therefore, it can be argued that in the national policy of the Russian authorities at the beginning of the 20th century. both the anti-Ukrainian and the anti-Polish vector, which became especially pronounced with the beginning of the First World War, were clearly visible. Despite the fact that a significant part of conscripted Ukrainians and Poles were in the active Russian army, including in command positions, the authorities treated the vast majority of the Ukrainian and Polish population with suspicion and distrust, resorted to harsh persecution and repression, accusing them of anti-Russian and separatist sentiments.

The socio-political movement of the German and Czech ethnic minorities was significantly different from the Jewish, Polish and Russian, not having a clearly formed direction and position. Social and political organizations have not yet been formed among the German minority. In particular, the reason for the intensification of the religious movement was the fact that during the First World War the German colonies were completely destroyed.

Taking into account the traditionally high degree of religiosity of Germans and the fact that all public life was initiated and supported by church communities, it can be argued that the church plays a significant role in their life. The Germans who arrived on the Right Bank of Ukraine were characterized by a heterogeneous religious composition and belonged to different directions of Christianity. Among them were Catholics and representatives of various Protestant denominations - mostly Lutherans. There were also Mennonites and a small number of Stundists and Baptists. Therefore, the issue of the religious composition of the German colonists also needs a separate coverage [131, p. 12].

On the eve of 1917, in the three right-bank Ukrainian provinces, the overwhelming majority of the German population professed Lutheranism: about 180,000 people, or 94%. Among the three provinces, the largest share of Lutherans was in Volyn, where other denominations had a small number of adherents. In Kyiv province, out of 14,707 people, 87% of Germans belonged to Lutherans, 6.5% to Catholics, 4% to Baptists, 2.5% to representatives of other denominations [132, pp. 187]. The public views of the German minority strongly depended on the religious environment of the colonies.

Let us casually note one of the peculiarities of the attitude towards the German ethnic group on the part of the Russian government on the eve of the Ukrainian revolution. The policy regarding public associations, unions of national minorities depended on their nationality and especially on the goals of such associations. Any national societies whose goal was national, political education were prohibited. German societies, in contrast to Ukrainian, Jewish, and Polish societies, set themselves the goal of public, educational, and charitable activities, so they did not experience significant obstacles. Unlike most Polish and Jewish societies, only persons of German origin could be members of German societies.

However, with the beginning of the First World War, the situation changed. The deportation of German colonists in 1915–1916 dealt a severe blow to the social movement of Germans on the Right Bank. On June 30, 1916, 7,500 separate German landholdings in the Volyn province with a total area of about 100,000 dehsents were transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, the German national minority of Right Bank Ukraine was deprived of the positions in society that it occupied at the beginning of the 20th century. The Russian government understood the danger of the political activity of the German minority, so it took all possible measures to prevent it [133, p. 275].

The socio-political life of the Czech colonists of Right Bank Ukraine on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution was more active than the German one. The civil movement of the Czechs was formed on the basis of the liberalization of the Russian government's policy towards the Czech minority, the strengthening of the influence of Slavophiles, the desire of tsarism to create a force in the western region of the empire that would oppose the Poles, as well as the Ukrainians, whose national aspirations were suppressed in every way.

Thanks to the Czechs, the government of that time also wanted to speed up the economic development of one of the most remote western regions. Therefore, developing on the eve of the Ukrainian revolution mainly under the influence of economic factors, Czech emigration in Volyn grew intensively as a result of support and encouragement from the government.

A significant role in the Czech public life of Right-Bank Ukraine on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution was played by the Czech People's Council (hereafter NCR) - a free supra-party association of Czech patriotic forces whose task was to resist German influence on the Czech lands. The activities of the foreign department of the National People's Republic of Ukraine were directed, in particular, to communication with Kraiyans* and Kraiyan circles abroad, as well as theoretical and practical solutions to the problems of immigrants. The National People's Republic Fund (in the Czech Republic) contains numerous materials for the study of the problems of immigrants, the life and activities of Czechs abroad [134, pp. 33-35].

In particular, at the beginning of the First World War, at a meeting of the most authoritative public organization of the Czechs of Kyiv - the society named after Jan Amos Comenius, it was decided to convene a large meeting of the Czechs of the Volyn, Kyiv, and Podil provinces to accept a petition to Tsar Nicholas II expressing their support in the war and requesting the transition to Russian citizenship. At the same time, in August 1914, the Moscow "Czech Committee" turned to the Russian Ministry of Defense with a project to organize Czech legions in Russia.

On August 8, 1914, in Kyiv, at the same meeting of representatives of Czech communities and the society named after J. A. Comensky, the Czech Committee for Aid to Victims of War (ČKDZV) was formed, which was headed by entrepreneur and active public figure Jindřich Jindříšek (Henrykh-Ignatiy Ignatiyovych) – the organizer of the anti-Habsburg movement among the Czech national minority of the Russian Empire and Right-Bank Ukraine in particular. On August 9, the committee appealed to the Czechs in Russia to create Czech military units [135, ark. 91].

František Dedina and F. Paul were one of the most famous Czech public and political figures on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution. F. Dedina called on young people to join the ranks of the Czech military formations in the Russian Empire, gave patriotic speeches in the Kyiv sports hall "Falcon". Dedina's words made a strong impression on young people. Under their influence, Karel Kutlvashr, the future general,

* Kraiyans (compatriots) are residents of a certain region or country in relation to the indigenous population of the same region.

and J. Vuchterle, the future company commander in the battle near Zborovo, signed up for Druzhina Golasek. Also, F. Dedina, in the spring of 1915, prepared the holding of the First Congress of the Union of Czechoslovak Societies. In addition, he obtained permission and himself organized "Evenings of Slavic Unity" in Kyiv, where Slavs living in the city gathered. He gave one thousand rubles to the Committee of War Victims, which he divided so that the Kyiv military hospitals received half, and the committee had to divide the other half between the injured Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia and Serbia [135, ark. 105–111].

F. Paul was one of the first to join the organization of the liberation movement among Russian Czechs. He was elected a member of the Kyiv Czech Committee for Aid to War Victims. He became an associate of J. Jindříšek, O. Chervena, V. Shvigovskyi, V. Vondrak and others. In August-September 1914, the Czech Committee in Kyiv sent F. Paula to Petrograd to draft a memorandum to the tsar about the Czechoslovak liberation movement [136, p. 123].

In general, the social and political movement of the Czechs was mostly national in nature, with the aim of preserving the national and political interests of the minority. In particular, the Czech minority of the Right Bank before the Ukrainian Revolution cooperated with the Russian government, receiving economic and political privileges and actively resisted the German and Polish resistance to the Russian government during the First World War.

Thus, the social and political life of Russians, Poles, Jews, Germans and Czechs and the territory of the Right Bank until 1917 was determined by the strict policy of autocracy, the influence of the First World War. In particular, the Russian government supported public associations of Russian and Czech minorities, active opposition was carried out in relation to Polish, Jewish and German public positions. The factors of support and persecution of minorities by the Russian administration, its incompetence in the field of management, the post-war devastation and the formation of the national consciousness of the peoples of Right-Bank Ukraine became the determining basis of the public position in the process of the formation of the Ukrainian government on the eve of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921.

6.2 The political and legal situation of the ethnic minorities of the Right Bank during the period of the change of Ukrainian governments in 1917–1919

The policies of the Central Ukrainian SSR, the government of P. Skoropadsky and the Directory became fundamental factors for the activation of the socio-political movement of Russian, Polish, Jewish, Czech, German and other ethnic minorities in Kyiv, Volyn and Podilsk provinces.

In particular, Russians in Right-Bank Ukraine with the beginning of the February Democratic Revolution in 1917 satisfied their political preferences in all-Russian parties, which more or less openly advocated the preservation of the unitary Russian state, against its transformation into a federation of equal peoples, and even more so, their separation from of Russia, then in the new conditions they turned out to be unprepared for constructive cooperation with the organized Ukrainian intelligentsia. The degree of political mobilization of Russians was much lower than its potential. This was especially acute in comparison with the activity of Jews and Poles.

After the adoption of the First Universal, 15 Russian deputies (out of 65 people) joined the Small Council of the Ukrainian SSR. After the adoption of the Second Universal, more than 14% of Russians were in the Central Rada.

On September 25, 1917, the "Congress of Representatives of Peoples and Regions Who Aspired to the Federal Reconstruction of Russia" was held on the initiative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The congress was attended by: 15 Muslims; 10 Ukrainians, Latvians and Jews; 3 Russian and Estonian socialist revolutionaries [137, p. 18, 132].

Only with the growth of the role of the Central Rada in the political life of Ukraine and with the strengthening of the Ukrainian national movement, Russian organizations began to emerge in Kyiv: "Democratic Union of Russian Culture", "Rus" society and others. V. Voinalovich called these organizations "small islands of uninsured people in the great sea of Ukrainian elements" [138, p. 74]. More active Russian associations, similar to the structures of other ethnic minorities, began to form only in 1918 [139, p. 86].

During the spring of 1917, a number of congresses of political parties of ethnic minorities took place in Ukraine with the aim of developing their programs and determining the tactics of activity during the Ukrainian revolution.

The most influential of all Russian parties in Right-Bank Ukraine was the Party of People's Freedom, better known as the Party of Cadets. The main base of cadets in Ukraine were big cities - Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv. 7.5–8 thousand people were concentrated in its organizations operating on the territory of Ukraine. The social base of the party consisted of the upper circles of the liberal intelligentsia and officials, the middle bourgeoisie, and the countrymen. National composition of the party: Russians, Ukrainians, Jews. The People's Freedom Party intensified its activities on the Right Bank after the beginning of the revolutionary unrest. After all, this region has always been the object of interest not only of the titular ethnic group - Ukrainians, but also of Poles. The cadets stood up to protect the interests of the empire. In 1917, the party "took an openly hostile position towards the liberation struggles of the Ukrainian people and began to move toward the reconstruction of a centralist, single, indivisible Russian empire" [140, p. 139–142]. In May 1917, the party proclaimed that "preserving the state unity of Russia is the limit that the party will not cross. The breakdown of the state into sovereign, even partially, units is completely impossible for the party" [140, p. 147].

Point one of the Party Program established the equality before the law of all Russian citizens, regardless of nationality, the elimination of status privileges: all restrictions on the personal and property rights of Poles, Jews and all other individual population groups, without exception, must be abolished. This was of great importance in Right Bank Ukraine, where the largest number of Poles and Jews lived.

Clause No. 11 of the Program provided for the guarantee of the right to cultural self-determination, i.e. complete freedom to use the languages of national minorities, freedom to create and maintain educational institutions, preservation and development of the language and culture of each nationality. A little later, amendments were made to items #11, #12, #24, #25 of the party program. The essence of the changes was that Russian, as the national language, should continue to be the language of state

institutions and the armed forces. The use of other languages in lower-level state authorities was only allowed under the conditions of legislative protection of the Russian language. Education in national languages was allowed only at the primary school level. In addition, the changes made to the cadet program provided for the possibility of granting local self-government bodies the right of so-called "provincial autonomy", that is, the possibility of submitting joint petitions on certain issues to central institutions and issuing normative acts in some spheres of economic and cultural activity. At the same time, the Constitutional Democratic Party considered it necessary to grant the central government the right to cancel the specified regulatory acts in cases where they "violate the limits of autonomy established by the national constitution" [140, p. 146–147].

The party did not recognize the Universals of the Central Rada. As V. Voeykov emphasizes, in the response of the Podilsk Committee of the Party of Cadets regarding the First Universal, the Radu was called a "self-appointed" and chauvinistic leadership that is trying to quarrel Russians and Ukrainians. And questions regarding the fate of Ukraine should, according to the authors of the appeal, be decided exclusively by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Then, after the adoption of the III Universal, there was a call from the Kyiv Committee of the Cadet Party, in which the position regarding the Ukrainian People's Republic was determined: the Cadets opposed this state, "for a free autonomous Ukraine in close union with all of Russia" [141, p. 230].

The Cadet Party had its own representation in the Central Rada. Out of 202 active members and 51 candidates, cadets received 10 active members and 2 candidate positions.

The Russian Mensheviks supported the idea of a unitary state. In 1917, 50 local branches of the RSDLP(m) operated in Ukraine, the number of their members reached 40,000. The party had representatives in the Central Rada and the Small Rada. According to the "Resolution of the commission on the project of replenishing the national composition of the Ukrainian Central Rada with representatives of the peoples living in Ukraine as a minority" dated June 28, 1917, the Mensheviks received 2 seats [142, pp. 88–89]. The Menshevik faction in the Central Rada accepted the demand for

Ukrainian autonomy within the Russian federal state. Autonomy was supported by the representatives of the RSDLP(m) A. Mustafov and the leader of the SRs B. Chernyak [142, pp. 91–93, 98–99].

The party of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries was quite influential on the Right Bank during the Ukrainian Revolution. Its cells were active in all provinces. The total population reached 69,000 people. The Russian SRs were members of the Central Rada (they had 2 seats) and the Small Rada. Party leader O. Zarubin was a member of the General Secretariat. According to the program, the party advocated the transformation of Russia into a federation. On the other hand, the predominance of Russian political parties in Ukraine created great difficulties for the implementation of even the smallest Ukrainian demands, and without the consent of the Russian Mensheviks, SRs, and Cadets, the Ukrainian liberation forces could not solve the main issues of the Ukrainian revolution. Therefore, both the Central Rada and the Ukrainian socialists had to constantly turn to the Russian socialists, listening to them.

In the first half of 1918, the Volyn branch of the "Russian Union" intensified its activities, the members of which aimed to unite democratic forces under the slogan of "national peace". The Union Council included people with different political views. These are cadets (Puzanov, Abbarius, Saplin, Tugengold, Huk, Polyniev, Ivanovsky, Slonytskyi, Katkovskyi, Semenov), social democrats (Prokudin), non-party members (Shakhovskaya, Orzhevskaya). On April 21, 1918, a meeting of the union was held, where the prevailing opinion was that due to the law on national-personal autonomy, a small parliament would be created in Volyn, around which representatives of the political movement would unite into a national community [143, pp. 72].

The ambiguous situation regarding the Russian minority in Right Bank Ukraine developed during the reign of P. Skoropadskyi in 1918. According to the Russian researcher N. Golovin, due to the desire to retain power, the hetman asked for help from representatives of all anti-Bolshevik forces, announcing a federation with the future non-Bolshevik Russia. In addition, on November 14, the hetman dismissed the government of F. Lyzogub. And although the ministerial crisis had been brewing for a long time, the main reason was his change in foreign policy orientation. The new

composition of the cabinet consisted of people with a pro-Russian orientation [144, p. 568].

During the administration of the UNR Directory, the socio-political status of the Russian minority on the Right Bank lost its previous importance. As a result, the degree of political mobilization of Russians at that time turned out to be much lower than their potential. The idea of all all-Russian parties in the Kyiv, Volyn and Podil provinces was aimed at preserving the integrity and indivisibility of the Russian state. Despite disagreements on many issues in the resolution of the Ukrainian question, these forces either rejected and did not recognize the very fact of the existence of the Ukrainian people as a separate ethnic community, or ignored it, giving priority to the class principle of the division of society, rather than the national one.

After the liquidation of the Russian monarchy in 1917, the Jewish minority supported the formation of the Ukrainian state. Already on March 9, 1917, the political parties and movements of Volyn organized a demonstration in Zhytomyr. The military garrison, students of primary and secondary schools, and citizens of the city took part in the celebrations.

Features of social and political life were reflected on the pages of periodicals. If with the beginning of the First World War some newspapers and magazines were banned, then the February Revolution brought periodicals back to life, and new ones began to appear. On the eve of the elections, a rather tense situation developed, as various competing forces tried to position themselves as the only representatives of national interests [145, p. 31].

Jewish parties determined their attitude to the Ukrainian revolution and political changes in this way. Instead, with the beginning of the establishment of Soviet power, the Jewish parties were persecuted by the Bolsheviks for their loyal attitude to the Central Rada.

The Zionists expressed their attitude towards the statehood of Ukraine in a different way, since at first they supported the policy of the Provisional Government. The Zionist movement was represented by two parties: the Zionist Socialist Party (ZSP) and the Zionist Socialist Labor Party (ZSLP), which on the Right Bank stood for territorialism,

i.e. compact living of Jews. In a telegram dated March 26, 1917, the General Assembly of Zhytomyr Zionists warmly welcomed the Provisional Government and expressed "willingness to support your glorious struggle with all our might, sincerely believing that a truly free Russia will be a country of free peoples, where the Jewish nation will also find an opportunity to improve its living conditions on the way to its national revival" [146, p. 88]. Zionist leaders also emphasized that in the West, equality was granted to Jews on the condition of their assimilation, while in Russia they were recognized as a people. As a people, Jews should be given the right of representation in central and local authorities, the right to free use of their languages in education and culture [147, ark. 309]. Zionists believed that even if national demands were met, the problem of the entire Jewish nation could not be solved in the Diaspora. In any case, Jews there will have to adapt to someone else's way of life, someone else's culture, someone else's laws.

Jewish public and political organizations were very active in the life of Zhytomyr, where on April 2, 1917, at a meeting of Zionists, elections were held for the presidium of the city committee. U. Bitelman was elected as chairman, M. Zilist as secretary, and

U. Berezon as treasurer [148, ark. 160]. And later the head was re-elected, Yu. Feinzilber became him. The local population even elected 177 people to the "Council of Affairs of the Zhytomyr Jewish Community" to protect their public interests [149, ark. 306 , 459]. The Zionists of Uman were no less active, as evidenced by their regular meetings and preparations for local elections, in which they always received the majority of votes compared to other Jewish parties and organizations [146, ark. 3–12].

Unlike the Zionists, the tenth conference of the Bund in April 1917 limited its tasks to the organization of institutions that should ensure the national and cultural autonomy of Jewish life. Its scope was to cover all aspects of Jewish cultural life: school and education, literature and art, science and technology. Bundists defended the secular nature of all cultural institutions, noting that religious organizations should be independent and protected by state laws [150, p. 91]. The Bund advocated the development of culture in Yiddish, considered it necessary to grant the right to local organizations to have schools with instruction not only in Hebrew, but also in other

languages. The Bund program also contained a requirement to finance the institutions of national and cultural autonomy from the state budget and to grant these institutions rights, including forced taxation of Jews.

The leaders of the Bund, a social-democratic party, opposed radical forms of class struggle in the Jewish community on the Right Bank, as it could destroy Jewish industry and put thousands of hired workers out of work. In addition, they were inclined to peaceful methods of regulating relations between labor and capital. They recognized all types of strikes only as a last resort when all others had been exhausted. To reinforce this position, the example of Western countries was cited, where the better organized the proletariat, the fewer strikes [151, p. 60].

In general, the Jewish parties accepted the Central Council as a free body and acted in it as its equal members, with equal political and national rights. In August 1917, in the Central Council, the Jewish parties received: the Bund – 13 seats, the United Jewish Socialist Labors Party (UJSLP or Fareynigte)* – 13, the Zionists – 13, the Jewish Social Democratic Labors Party (JSDLP "Poalei Zion")** – 9, the Jewish Democratic Association – 2. In addition, Jewish parties were to nominate 13 deputy deputies: the Bund – 4, and the others – 3 each [152, p. 222]. In total, more than 50 representatives of various Jewish parties were included in the Central Committee of Ukraine.

The Small Council included 16 representatives of Jewish parties and associations. From Poalei Zion – S. Goldelman and P. Menchkivskyi; from the Bund – O. Zolotaryov, M. Lieber, M. Rafes and A. Tiomkin; from Fareynigte – Gutman, Dubinsky, M. Zilberfarb, M. Litvakov, Hurgin and M. Shats-Anin; Zionists Sorokin and N. Syrkin, as well as Yudin. Later, the people of Nirenberg and Lipets also took part in the work of the Small Council. The representative of the EUSR, Moshe Zilberfarb, was appointed vice-secretary for Jewish affairs. The head of the Bund M.

* Fareynigte – United Jewish Socialist Labors Party (UJSLP), which was formed in June 1917 as a result of the merger of the Zionist Socialist Workers' Party (SSRP) and the Socialist Jewish Workers' Party (SERP). The main goal of the OESRP was national and personal autonomy, which provided for self-government not only in the cultural, but also in the social life of the Jews.

** Poalei Zion, Jewish Social Democratic Labor Party (JSDLP) is a Jewish socialist organization that was founded in 1906. Some members of Poalei Zion, in particular Solomon Goldelman, actively supported the idea of Ukrainian statehood. In the USSR, the activity of the organization was banned in 1928.

Rafes became a member of the General Secretariat of the Central Rada, and the leader of territorialists, lawyer and public figure A. Margolin became a member of the Supreme Court [153, p. 73–74]. Such data prove that the Jewish ethnic minority took the most active part in the state-building processes in Ukraine and the Right Bank, in particular, where the number of Jews was the largest.

The Bund conference in August 1917 supported the revolutionary changes in Ukraine, the struggle of broad sections of the Ukrainian people for the democratization of the state system. The decision of the conference emphasized the need for a proper solution to the national and, in particular, the Jewish question in Ukraine. For this, it was necessary to ensure the language rights of ethnic minorities in all spheres of social and political life, as well as the right to free cultural development in the form of national and cultural autonomy.

Instead, on June 29, 1917, the Bureau of the South-Western District Committee of the Jewish Social-Democratic Labor Party noted the need for: recognition by the Provisional Government of the Central Rada; start preparing documents for the development of the Ukrainian state.

The district committee also believed that representatives of national minorities are obliged to form nationally autonomous institutions with relevant local bodies throughout the territory of the Right Bank [154, ark. 159].

Jewish leaders imagined the order of organizing elections to the higher legislative body in different ways. On August 5, 1917, at the first meeting of the VI session of the Central Rada, it was proposed to elect representatives to the higher legislative body not from parties, but from the entire Jewish population. After the creation of the General Secretariat, the post of General Secretary for Nationalities Affairs was created, who had three vice-secretaries for Russian, Jewish, and Polish affairs [153, p. 138].

The positions of the representatives of the Ukrainian and Jewish parties in Right-Bank Ukraine on the main state-building issues, as a rule, coincided. This was also the case in August 1917 at the VI session during the discussion of "Temporary instructions to the General Secretariat of the Provisional Government in Ukraine." The instruction greatly narrowed the autonomy of Ukraine, limiting the territory of the region to only

five gubernias (Kyiv, Podil, Volyn, Poltava, and Chernihiv). In particular, representatives of the EUDRP "Poalei Zion", the Bund and other Jewish parties protested against Petrograd's policy of restrictions on Ukraine. It had the appearance of a manifestation of friendly cooperation between the national movements of both peoples.

After February 1917, the number of members of the Bund began to grow rapidly. They united around the Southern regional, Kyiv, Katerynoslav and Odesa district committees. In August 1917, the largest Bund organizations in Right Bank Ukraine were: Kyiv - 760 people; Bilotserkivska - 350 people; Vinnytsia - 250 people [155, p. 132].

Some of the members of the SSLP and SJLP, who did not join the UJSLP, joined the Volkspartei*. The central point of the party program was "national-personal autonomy", which provided for Jewish self-government not only in matters of culture ("cultural-national autonomy"), but also covered the solution of social and other issues.

The Zionist party prevailed in most Jewish communities not only in the center, but also on the periphery. In particular, the general meeting of the Jews of the city of Volodymyrets, Volyn province, convened on September 5, 1917 by the city's Zionist organization, spoke in favor of the representation in the Central Council of broad sections of the Jewish population of Ukraine. The meeting defined the then-existing representation from the Bund and the United Jewish Socialists as one-sided, expressing confidence in the representatives of the Zionists [156, ark. 3–10, 141–146].

In Podilla, the Zionists were led by lawyer I. Roisenburd, store owner E. Shapiro, merchants H. Sliozberg and I. Kleinman. Jewish political parties played a special role in the social life of Vinnytsia. There were 12 parties in the small Vinnytsia Jewish community. As the newspaper "Vinnytsia Listok" emphasized, in September 1917 they managed to open 2 Jewish gymnasiums in Vinnytsia. The newspaper also describes and gives examples that even Jewish children over the age of 10 took part in social and political life [157].

* Volkspartei - the Jewish People's Democratic Party, the main goal of which was the national and cultural autonomy of the Jews.

According to the data of the State Archive of the Vinnytsia Region, in July and August of 1917, lists of 15 parties and blocs were submitted to the city administration of Vinnytsia. National minorities were represented by the Polish People's Party, the United Jewish Socialist Workers' Party, the Jewish National Bloc, and the Socialist Bloc, which included not only the Jewish Bund, but also the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The United Socialists and the Jewish bloc were among the favorites in the competition [158, ark. 33; 50, ark. 2 vol.]. In July 1917, the Jewish "Bund" united with the RSDLP(m) and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. This merger, with the support of the Jews, was able to control the trade unions of tailors and printing workers, which influenced the circulation of propaganda products. The rivalry between the political forces was hostile - more and more chauvinistic slogans were heard. Sometimes the case went to court. In the final result, on September 20, 1917, Israel Yakovych Slutsky was elected chairman of the City Duma, for whom 27 councilors voted [160, ark. 126].

In November, the Ukrainian Central Rada established power in Vinnytsia. On November 4, 1917, the Regional Committee for Protection of Revolution and Order, formed under the Executive Committee of the Council of Public Organizations, self-liquidated and transferred its powers to the General Secretariat. Hryhoriy Kalistratovych Stepura, assistant to the Podillia gubernatorial commissioner, noted on November 8 that "decrees not approved by the Central Rada are illegal, or proclamations that you have no right to spread or implement without the permission of the General Secretariat as a county commissioner" [160, ark. 138].

Most of the Jewish parties supported the autonomy of the Ukrainian People's Republic. In particular, on November 17, a solemn meeting was held in the city theater on the occasion of the proclamation of the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Representatives of the United Jewish Socialist Labor Party were present there. In particular, X. Kiel welcomed the Third Universal and the newly formed Ukrainian People's Republic, but emphasized that autonomous Ukraine should be an integral part of federal Russia. Each of the parties expressed its own opinion regarding Ukraine's autonomist aspirations:

- M. Haimon, a representative of "Tseirei-Zion" expressed his support for the autonomy of the Ukrainian People's Republic and advocated the equality of the Jewish nation and other peoples inhabiting Ukraine;

- M. Luchanskyi, on behalf of the Jewish National-Democratic faction, congratulated the autonomous UNR as part of the Russian Federal Republic;

- V. Swederskyi, representing Polish interests, sincerely welcomed the Ukrainian People's Republic. But he did not bypass the social reforms of the Central Rada, sharply criticizing them, protesting against some points of the III Universal.

- The Socialist Polish Party (or PPS) led by O. Radosz, in contrast to Swederski, supported the social reforms of the UCR, emphasizing their effectiveness. Its representatives also congratulated the fraternal Ukrainian people and the "Ukrainian Federal Republic" [161, ark. 359–362].

In general, representatives of Vinnytsia's ethnic minorities supported the III Universal of the Ukrainian SSR and the autonomy of the Ukrainian SSR, but with their own interests in mind.

Of all the Jewish parties in the elections of deputies of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, the Zionists received the majority of votes – 120,063 (66%) of the votes of Jewish voters in the Right Bank provinces. The second place was taken by the Bund – 33,369 (18.4%) votes; the third UJSLP – 18,520 (10.1%); the fourth JSDLP – 9903 (5.5%). In the Kyiv province, the distribution of seats in the elections was similar: Zionists – 68,604 (66.7%) votes, Bund – 17,551 (17%), UJSLP – 13,223 (12.8%), JSDLP – 3,557 (3.5%). In Podilla, the popularity of Jewish parties among voters was different: Zionists – 16,887 (56.5%) votes, Bund – 6,030 (20.2%), JSDLP – 3,669 (12.3%), UJSLP – 3,285 (11%). Such a distribution of seats also took place in Volyn: Zionists – 34,572 (70.5%) votes, Bund – 9,788 (20%), JSDLP – 2,677 (5.5%), UJSLP – 2012 (4%) [162].

Podil and Volyn representatives of Jewish parties recognized the Central Rada as the highest authority in Ukraine, expressed a desire to cooperate with it, nominate their representatives to its composition. Despite inter-party contradictions, the positions of these parties regarding the authorities in Ukraine were almost identical.

V. Vynnychenko, analyzing the positions of the parties of national minorities, wrote: "Especially the Jews, purely Jewish political parties, took a judicious attitude, and some of them were even sympathetic to the idea of Ukrainian statehood. They accepted the idea of Ukrainian statehood as a fact, as something natural and inevitable, incorporated it into their worldview, adapted their own aspirations to it, and quite consciously resolutely and consistently recognized themselves as citizens of the Ukrainian state" [163, pp. 6–9].

The newspaper "Podolskie Vedomosti" characterized the attitude of Jews towards the Ukrainian state as follows: "The fate of millions of Jews living in Ukraine also depends on the mysterious existence of Ukraine. We Jews have numerous miscalculations with Ukraine. It should not be denied that the majority of Jews do not have Ukrainian patriotism. And an ordinary Jew, who has always felt that he is spiritually higher than the serf of a small Russian and a bourgeois, will not so easily get used to the idea that Ukraine is a state, "Ukrainian" is the language, and "Kobzar" is the culture, so say the Jews to whom the Central Rada generously gave the position of minister » [164]. Despite the desire for their own autonomy, the positions of the Ukrainian and Jewish parties on the main state-building issues, as a rule, coincided.

During the voting for the III Universal of the Central Rada, the Jewish political parties were divided. However, during the voting for IV Universal, the idea of national-personal autonomy united them in support of Ukrainian statehood. The law became an organic part of the Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic and granted the "Great Russian", Jewish and Polish ethnic communities the right to national and personal autonomy. Other national minorities could enjoy such a right, provided they collect 10,000 signatures each and submit a corresponding application to the General Court. Each national group was given the right to create its own national union, which had the exclusive right to represent the given nation in state and public institutions. In order to implement the state policy regarding national minorities, the Secretariat for Nationalities Affairs was established as a special state body, as well as government departments: Jewish, Polish, and Russian.

In the light of democratic slogans, political parties and movements of ethnic minorities of the Volyn province are intensifying their activities. An example can be the results of the first city elections in Zhytomyr at the end of 1917. A total of 11,108 citizens took part in the elections. 2,764 people voted for Polish parties and public movements, 3,683 people voted for the Jewish (Jewish Party – 2,173, Bund – 922, United Jewish Socialist Party – 359, Poalei-Zion – 125, Volkspartai – 104), Ukrainian (Ukrainian Socialists – revolutionaries and the Volyn Council of Peasant Deputies – 1147, Orthodox parishioners – 1106, Ukrainian Social Democrats – 365, Ukrainian Socialist Federalists – 186, Ukrainian Trudoviks – 54) – 2858, Russian (people's freedom) – 769, Russian Social Democrats (united) – 364, socialist revolutionaries – 118) – 1251 people, Bolsheviks – 480 people, for the Czech-Slovak working peasantry – 170 people. [165, p. 73].

In January 1918, the Bolsheviks returned to Vinnytsia. The Jewish minority was very large, so the Bolsheviks were careful with them. On January 26, the first issue of the Jewish newspaper "Nabat" was published with the support of Edelshtein Yevhen Pylypovich ("comrade Filippov").

The Bolsheviks, who captured Kyiv at the end of January 1918, did not enjoy the support of Jewish parties. Later, M. Shats-Anin (UJSLP) noted at a meeting of the Small Council, "the old government made many mistakes in the cause of peace, but the Bolsheviks will correct these mistakes in such a way that we will not be able to correct their work later" [166, ark. 96]. Also, at the beginning of 1918, elections to public councils were held in Kyiv, in which only 15,164 people (25.1%) participated out of 60,354 Jews who had the right to vote. 32 Zionists, 7 representatives of the Volkspartai, 7 – from the Bund, 4 – from Poalei-Zion, 5 – on religious lists and the same number on local lists were elected to the council of communities [167, ark. 16–21]. During the changes of government and the repressions that accompanied them, the community tried to help the Jews of the city as much as possible. The parties organized: a survey of Jewish children in primary and secondary schools to find out the need to expand

the network of Jewish education; help Talmud Torah^{*}; opening of a polyclinic in Podil; support of low-income groups of Jews [168, p. 166].

In 1918–1919, Jewish organizations also took part in elections to local authorities. In the elections to the Kyiv City Duma, Jewish organizations acted as a single democratic bloc, which called for the nomination of representatives from the broad Jewish masses. Their national interests were to protect representatives of all classes and population groups [169, ark. 42]. Jews received a day off during the April 1918 elections to the Uman Jewish Community Council [170, ark. 73–75].

The Jewish socialist factions in the Kyiv City Duma formed a delegation to S. Petlyura with the aim of discussing the issue of preventing possible violence when troops entered Kyiv in March 1918. The delegates also had information that the presence of a certain number of Jewish commanders in the Ukrainian army could be used to provoke anti-Semitic sentiments in military units. Delegation member M. Rafes recalled that after the negotiations, S. Petliura said that he could not guarantee anything. He knew the mood of the soldiers, but he saw in them a thirst for revenge, not anti-Semitism. However, Petliura, at the request of the delegates, agreed to enter Kyiv not through Podil, inhabited mainly by the Jewish population, but through Kurenivka. However, it was not possible to prevent violence. Many Jews were beaten, robbed, shot [171, pp. 16–19].

The newspaper "Kievskaya mysl" noted that after the occupation of Kyiv, the Bolsheviks canceled the law on cultural and national autonomy and liquidated the Ministry of National Minorities. The Bolsheviks did not receive the support of the Jewish parties, as they did not recognize their rights for the development of national life [172][171, p. 174]. At the congress of the United Jewish Socialists in Kyiv, a resolution was adopted that advocated "councils without Bolsheviks." Jewish parties took an active part in the actions of resistance against the Bolsheviks. In January 1918, factions of the RSDLP (united), the Bund, the Socialists, and the Poalei-Zion opposed

^{*} Talmud Torah is a Jewish religious primary educational institution for boys from low-income families that arose in Europe during the Middle Ages. Pupils studied Hebrew, Torah and Talmud, sometimes other subjects were introduced: arithmetic, writing in Yiddish and others.

the Bolsheviks for their attempts to disperse the Constituent Assembly. The greatest opposition to the Bolsheviks on the Right Bank came from Jewish social democrats and Zionists. In their policy, they tried to weaken the power of the Bolshevik strikes, which was carried out on the democratic public, and thus reduce the threat of an upcoming reaction. The Jewish parties' opposition to the Bolsheviks' policy was one of the factors that determined their cooperation with the democratic forces of Ukraine. In 1918, the Jewish Community Council (JCC) was to be established to manage all Jewish affairs and institutions. Its financing was provided at the expense of the box tax and state funds [173, ark. 15–18]. The JCC was first established as an advisory body under the Vice-Secretariat. The organization was to become an active factor in the revival of Jewish autonomous life.

Instead, the Zionists opposed the hegemony of the socialists of the JCC. The Zionists chose the right to national-personal autonomy, which would give an opportunity to create territorial autonomy. The Zionists also had a negative attitude towards the Hetman's coup [174, ark. 8].

Jewish organizations and repressions of the German military authorities, directed against the left forces, did not escape. The Germans dispersed the Bund meetings in Kyiv and banned the congress of local Jewish organizations. Publication of the newspaper "Volkszeitung" was stopped [171, pp. 23–25].

In particular, after Pavel Skoropadsky came to power on April 29, 1918, the Zionists did not stop their activities [174, ark. 5–7]. The Hetman's government took a course to liquidate the main democratic assets of the Ukrainian People's Republic, in particular in the field of policy regarding national minorities. Then the Law on National Personal Autonomy was suspended, and the Ministry of National Minorities was liquidated, which lasted until September 1918. However, the Law "On Hetman's Power" gave the followers of each denomination the opportunity to freely use the rite of their own religious denomination.

On July 9, 1918, the "Law on National Personal Autonomy" was officially repealed. On November 6, 1918, a decree was published on the abolition of the Ministry of National Minorities and the dismissal of its ministers.

After coming to power, the Directory adopted a resolution on the restoration of national and personal autonomy, which was part of the Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic. In January 1919, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was created under the leadership of the leader of the Poalei-Zion A. Revutsky. The ministry planned a democratic way of building Jewish national autonomy. The legal and financial base, an extensive system of Jewish schools, support for medical care, regulation of emigration, defense of Jewish rights in various spheres of state life, transition of Jews to productive forms of work, protection of freedom of religion and activities of religious organizations had to be provided [175, ark. 1–3, 18–20; 67, sheet 21–22].

Like the Jews, the Polish national minority in 1917 had its own representation in the Central Rada (20 seats), i.e. 2.5%. On the Right Bank, the interests of this group (the third largest after Russian and Jewish) were also represented by political parties and organizations.

In March 1917, a gathering of Polish circles took place - the Kyiv District Council, which selected from among its members the "Committee of Nine", which took the initiative to create a wider political association. A few days later, on March 6, 1917, a meeting of the "United Polish Organizations" was held in Kyiv, where 552 delegates represented the interests of 233 associations of Poles, which were mainly concentrated in Podil, Volyn, and Kyiv Oblast and represented the interests of mainly landlords, bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and clergy [177, pp. 165–167].

It is interesting that of all the women of the ethnic minorities of Right Bank Ukraine, it was the Poles who were the most independent and actively participated in public and political life. For example, on May 5, 1917, the Union of the Polish Women's Community in Volyn was established. The organization had a clear structure and charter with concretely formed ideological foundations and areas of activity [178, ark. 176–177].

One of the most influential Polish political figures in the Ukrainian SSR was lawyer A. Staniewicz, engineer V. Swederski, L. Dlugolentskii, Z. Groholskii - the self-proclaimed "Polish Commissioner of the Podilsk Region." The Polish Democratic Union was headed by lawyer F. Tsionglynski. On March 10, on the initiative of Letta

Yaroshynska, the educational society "Masierz Skolna na Podolu" resumed its activities. In June 1917, this society opened 300 folk schools and 3 Polish gymnasiums. Plays were staged in the Polish House under Shurkevich's leadership. "University for All named after Romuald Traugutt" gave the opportunity to listen to courses of lectures on nature, Polish history and literature. There was also a union of military Poles, headed by the garrison adjutant Second Lieutenant Kozakiewicz. In the future, this alliance became the basis of the Polish legion, which was based in the Groholsky manor in Pyatnychany, in the Vinnytsia region [179, p. 77].

Back in April 1917, the newspaper "Podolskie vedomosti" published an appeal of the Provisional Government to the Poles with the aim of uniting them around pro-Russian positions and with the promise of creating an independent Poland: "The Provisional Government considers the creation of an independent Polish state, which should be created from lands, inhabited by the Polish people is the key to the renewal of modern Europe. United with Russia by stable military alliances, the Polish state will be a powerful defender against the attack of other states on Slavism" [180]. The Provisional Government promoted the formation of the Polish Executive Committee (PEC), which included representatives of conservative circles as well as liberals and socialists. This composition of the committee allowed its leaders to claim that "the representatives of the vast majority of Polish citizens in this region are not individual parties, but the Communist Party of Ukraine" [181, pp. 11–13].

Most representatives of Polish political parties supported Ukraine's aspirations for autonomy. In particular, V. Svedersky emphasized that "Poles, being the original citizens of Ukraine, have the most favorable attitude towards the just aspirations of the fraternal people for self-determination and sincerely welcome the rising dawn of independent political life of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. But at the same time, they regret that the social reforms announced by the Ukrainian Rada are generally detrimental to the revival of Ukraine and lead to widespread anarchy, dangerous for the entire population of Ukraine and its future. Therefore, in the name of the good of the people, we are forced to protest against this part of the Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada" [182, p. 106].

Instead, O. Radosz (Polish Socialist Party) issued a call: "The Polish Socialist Party welcomes the Universal Declaration of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Council as an act confirming the rights of the Ukrainian people to an independent state life in union with the Russian Republic on the basis of the union of the free with the free. The social reforms announced by Universal provide an improvement in the economic life of the working people, both Ukrainian and other nationalities, who inhabit Ukraine and will give brilliant results in the near future. We are sure that the Ukrainian People's Republic will flourish magnificently, and waking up from the century-long sleep of slavery in the midst of unprecedented bloody discord, it will call all peoples to fraternal peace with the power of popular enthusiasm. Long live the Ukrainian People's Republic!" [182, pp. 107–108].

The day before, on June 18, 1917, a congress of Polish officers of Ukraine took place in Kyiv, which welcomed the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for political liberation and declared that the Poles were ready to support these aspirations. This meeting developed the draft "Statute of the Rights of the Polish People in Ukraine", which stated that Poles as a minority have the right "to take measures to preserve, support and develop the Polish nation (language, culture and economic and economic interests)" [183, pp. 238–239].

Having united, the Poles took a "favorable position towards the new government." At the meeting of the Council, in the same year 1917, S. Zelinsky stated that "at the meeting of Polish organizations, as well as the regional society, which unites 39 Polish organizations, it was decided to enter into contact with the Council of Public Organizations. For this purpose, a committee of 9 people was elected, which will coordinate its actions with the Council of Public Organizations" [184, pp. 11–14]. Representatives of the Committee of Nine – F. Kzhizhanivskyi and S. Zelinskyi - were sent to the Kyiv City Council of United Public Organizations. S. Zelinsky joined the Executive Committee of the Council and assumed the position of treasurer. Subsequently, this representation was increased to five seats in the Council and four seats in the Executive Committee. The same S. Zelinsky became a member of the special commission on the organization of the city militia. When the main

administrative collegial body of the province was founded in Kyiv on March 16 – the Kyiv Provincial Council of Public Organizations, it included two representatives from the Polish organization. They were Z. Khoetskyi and B. Perrot. Also, two Poles became members of the Kyiv County Council of Public Organizations. Similar representations of Poles arose in other cities, counties and provinces [185, ark. 2–4].

Subsequently, on July 4, 1917, after the agreement of the Central Rada with the Provisional Government, a delegation of the Polish Executive Committee was sent to it again "to come to an agreement on the participation of Poles in state-creative work in Ukraine." Among the demands put forward by the committee were the following: 1) provide representation to the Polish minority at the level of 5–6% of the number of members of the Central Rada; 2) to create the position of General Secretary for Polish affairs in the General Secretariat, and Polish referents at other secretariats; 3) appoint candidates elected by Polish organizations to these positions [186, ark. 137].

The Polish committee did not receive a reply to this letter from the Central Rada. Seats for the representation of the Polish minority were given to the Polish Democratic Central (PDC), from which M. Mickiewicz and V. Rudnytskyi joined the Council at the beginning of July 1917 [187, ark. 16–17].

P. Gai-Nizhnyk claimed that Poles, having entered the representation of higher state authorities and the Central Rada, received 22.5% of the seats reserved for national minorities. Polish seats were distributed according to the influence on the population, to a greater extent of the Right Bank, of Polish national parties [188, p. 51].

In particular, Polish interests were represented in the bodies of the Central Rada: in the Small Rada, Korsak (PPS revolutionary faction), V. Matuszewski (PPS – left, Polish National Democratic Central (PNDC)), V. Rudnytskyi, D. Pochetovsky (PNDC). The Assistant Secretary General of International Affairs for the Polish Department from July to November 1917, and from January 25 to April 28, 1918, the General Secretary (later Minister) of Polish Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic was Mechyslav Kazemirovich Mickiewicz [182, pp. 105–106].

Mieczyslaw Mickiewicz (sometimes Vyacheslav Mickiewicz) is a Polish politician, lawyer, originally from Kamianets-Podilskyi. He was one of the leaders of the central wing of the Polish National Democratic Party.

At the beginning of July 1917, during the resolution of the issue of replenishing the Central Rada with representatives of national minorities and transforming it into a "regional authority", M. Mickiewicz became in opposition to the Central Rada. He reacted particularly negatively to the beginning of the cooperation of Polish socialists and democrats with the Ukrainian SSR. In particular, after the negotiations of the Central Rada and the Provisional Government began, in which the General Secretary for Polish Affairs himself participated, the Polish Executive Committee (PEC) sent Kerensky its protest, pointing out that M. Mickiewicz did not have the right to represent the entire Polish population Ukrainian lands, but only the interests of a "small group called the Democratic Central", which cooperates with the Central Council. The reason for the conflict between the PEC and the Central Council was that the latter, taking into account the split of the PEC and the departure of democrats and socialists from it, rejected the demand of the Endeks to recognize the Committee as the sole representative of the Polish national minority of Ukraine and decided to replenish the composition of the plenum according to the party principle [189, pp. 223–225].

The Polish historian V. Mendzetsky emphasized that the Ukrainians were a separate nation that had the right to cultivate their own culture and language. The only way to a successful resolution of Ukrainian-Polish relations in Right-Bank Ukraine is the active participation of Poles in the process of forming a modern, developed Ukrainian nation. Polish political parties and organizations, showing respect to Ukrainians, helping them to find and find their own identity, should have suggested that the common mission of both nations was the joint victory of the mortal enemy - imperial Russia [190, pp. 38–46].

Poles, along with other peoples, showed a strong desire to take part in the development of revolutionary Russia and actively advocated democratic transformations. Poles, aware of their status as an ethnic minority in Ukraine, defended the interests of their historical homeland – Poland, and set themselves the task of

fighting for the greatest possible Polish presence (primarily political) on the Right Bank.

In December 1917, relations between supporters of the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks worsened. Armed clashes could start at any moment, but even then the national Jewish and left-wing Polish parties recognized the General Secretariat as the only body of executive power in Ukraine [191, p. 141]. This was confirmed at the meeting of the executive committee on March 8, 1918. A resolution was adopted, in which it was noted that Poles stand on the basis of self-determination of peoples. On March 18, a congratulatory letter was sent to the Ukrainian Central Rada, in which Ukrainians were called for mutual understanding and cooperation with the Poles as equal brotherly people.

Polish political parties in the Central Rada supported its bill on granting national minorities in Ukraine national and personal autonomy. Thus, on January 2, 1918, during the discussion of the specified bill in the Small Council, the member of the PPS (r) Korsak declared on behalf of Polish political organizations: "We welcome this law. From now on, it will be our battle slogan, for which we will also fight in Poland" [192, ark. 45].

However, as V. Mendzhetsky emphasizes, certain disagreements, which became a harbinger of future Polish-Ukrainian disputes, proved that the tragic page of the historical confrontation was never turned over. On January 9, 1918, L. Pochentovskyi, a member of the PPS (L) at a meeting of the Small Council, spoke against the Ukrainian government's assertion of Kholm region as its territory without holding a referendum there. Then, on March 15, 1918, at a meeting of the Small Council, he spoke against the ratification of the Beresteysky Treaty, since according to it Kholmshchyna joined the UNR [193, pp. 174–175]. Soon the Ukrainian People's Republic was overthrown as a result of a coup carried out by Pavel Skoropadsky, and the creation of the Ukrainian State in the form of the Hetmanate was announced.

The Ukrainian government was often forced to react sharply in 1918 to the occupation of certain regions of Podillia by Polish legions. In the same year, the Polish army captured the outskirts of Nemirov and the Olgopil district. The Poles

requisitioned oats, horses and messages at telegraph stations in the villages. On April 18, 1918, in Hnivan, Polish legionnaires and Ukrainian peasants agreed on peace only under the pressure and mediation of the Austrian colonel Linde. P. Skoropadsky applied certain restrictions to the Polish legions. As the "Podillia" newspaper emphasized, on April 30, 1918, the hetman's order was issued regarding the Polish troops in Ukraine. The gubernatorial and district commandants in relation to the Polish troops had to be guided by the following rules [194]:

- Polish troops had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the state and issue orders;

- requisitions by Polish troops regarding fodder, access to bread were to be stopped;

- the division of property and weapons between the troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Polish legions was prohibited.

At the same time, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky provided financial and material aid to the soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army, and his government, at the request of the Minister of Finance A. Rzepetskyi (a Pole by origin), on November 25, 1918, decided to release 1 million krb. by order of the Minister of Finance. for the issuance of an interest-free loan to the Polish special envoy in Ukraine for the provision of assistance to Polish refugees [195, ark. 29]. According to difficult conditions, the Polish national minority supported Skoropadski's government, with the hope of restoring the rights of the Polish nation.

With the coming to power of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic in December 1918, the law on national and cultural autonomy was restored on the Right Bank, but the Poles did not receive the right to form a corresponding national ministry. This refusal was justified by the fact that first of all it is necessary to establish relations with the newly formed Polish state and to agree on the guarantees of the rights of Ukrainians in Poland.

In June-November 1919, the city of Kamianets-Podilskyi was the temporary state center of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Meanwhile, the Polish population, on the basis of the restoration of the Polish state, stopped trusting the UPR. As it was emphasized in the newspaper "Renaissance", anti-Ukrainian propaganda was

often carried out among the peasants. Polish agitators spread information that the Polish army was planning to occupy Podillia.

The relations of the Poles with the government structures of the Ukrainian People's Republic revived after the declaration of the Council of Ministers of August 19, 1919, in which all nationalities of Ukraine swore to support the construction of the democratic independence of the Republic. At the end of August, a delegation of Poles from Podillia, which included Ya. Urbanskyi and S. Fliorchak, petitioned the leadership of the Ukrainian National People's Republic to grant national and personal autonomy to the Poles of Ukraine and promised to support Ukrainian statehood, as well as government policy and not to allow anti-government agitations. Representatives of Polish citizenship assured the authorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic that when the Poles of Podillia are given the opportunity to organize themselves, they will send a delegation to the Republic of Poland to convince Warsaw of the need for an understanding between Poland and the Ukrainian People's Republic [196, ark. 103–105].

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Isaak Mazepa, ordered the administrative bodies not to interfere with the assembly of Polish citizens, if they comply with the above-mentioned conditions. Regarding the provision of personal and national autonomy, the UNR government did not go to a meeting with the Polish community, waiting for the normalization of the regulation of the status of Ukrainians in Poland.

In the middle of 1919, Polish units occupied part of Podillia. Despite the fact that the Polish army came to the region as an ally of the Ukrainian People's Republic, an occupation regime was actually established. Ukrainian power structures were changing, searches, requisitions, and arrests were widely carried out. The Polish population of Podillia submitted an application to Józef Piłsudski about the inclusion of Kamianets in Poland. This caused anti-Polish sentiments among the Ukrainian population [197, ark. 5].

Despite everything, the Poles supported the aspirations of Ukrainians for self-determination. It is unlikely that this was due to some altruism of the Polish population

or their extraordinary devotion to the ideas of freedom and justice (although this could have taken place in the conditions of general elation during the Ukrainian revolution). Polish activists were aware that in the Ukrainian state (whether independent or an autonomous part of a wider federation) they would have a greater influence on political or economic life than in the Russian multinational (or even mononational, if Ukrainians were not recognized as a separate ethnic group), but not to the federal state. So the Poles were sincerely sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, based on their own interests.

In all programs of all political parties, the national factor occupied a leading place. It is important to note that all programs proclaimed the full equality of all citizens regardless of nationality, the legislative protection of the rights of national minorities, the granting of state status to national languages in places where minorities live compactly. Practically all parties that defended the autonomy of Ukraine included in their programs provisions on the right of national and personal autonomy for the non-Ukrainian population.

The socio-political life of the German minority was also marked by a certain dynamism, although much less compared to the Polish and Jewish minorities of the Right Bank. First, in 1917, 70% fewer Germans lived in the right-bank provinces than at the beginning of the First World War. Secondly, the Russian command of the South-Western Front was determined against the repatriation of the colonists and actively prevented their independent attempts to return to the Right Bank [198, pp. 272–273].

The repressive actions of the Russian military were often supported by the local population, which had already managed to occupy or loot the lands and property of the Germans, as well as the chauvinistic part of the public. Thus, in the second edition of the collection "German Evil" in 1917, its editor, the commander of the "Red Guard" units, M. Muravyov, as in the times of the autocracy, called to "finish the victory on both fronts", that is, not only over "external" Germany. and "internal" Germany, meaning the German population of the entire Russian Empire [199, p. 44]. Thus, the difficult political situation caused by the struggle of political interests forced the right-wing Germans to fight for their rights.

In the wake of the rapid development of democratic processes, the movement of the German ethnic minority for national and cultural autonomy arose and began to develop. Initially, it took the form of a struggle for the abolition of discriminatory measures implemented by the Russian government during the First World War against the German population, for the elimination of their negative consequences. The autonomist movement was not the only one. It had several regional centers and developed in the regions depending on the specific socio-political situation. There were three such centers of struggle of the German ethnic minority: in Saratov (February 1917), Odessa (March 1917) and Moscow (March 1917). Representatives of Volyn Germans took part in the Moscow Congress of April 20–22, 1917, at which the Main Committee of the All-Russian Organization of German Citizens was formed for representation in the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Its members included K. Lindemann (a professor at Kyiv University in 1918–1921), Ya. Propp, and A. Robertus [200, p. 253–255].

At the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution, the German ethnic minority of the Right Bank, along with the protection of property rights, significantly expanded its public activities, seeking to resolve the issues of revival of self-government, native language and culture, and church life. However, the fragmentation of the German national movement did not allow the Volyn Germans to defend their rights and interests in 1917. The German ethnic minority could not form any national political party, unlike the Jews and Poles. As for the elections in the volost and poviat zemstva, here German and Mennonite candidates were elected by the voters of their settlements and played an important role in the relevant zemstvo institutions of their volosts and poviats of the Volyn province [200, p. 267].

After the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the declaration of Soviet power in Russia, from November 1917 to February 1918, the Soviet troops fought against the armed forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic of Ukraine. During this period, the process of expropriation in the German colonies of Ukraine took on a massive character. Since the German representation in the Ukrainian SSR in 1917 was insignificant - according to the report of the mandate commission - one seat from the

Germans and one from the Mennonites, therefore the Germans began to defend the main right to national self-determination during the government of P. Skoropadskyi [201, p. 28].

At the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution, we can note the activities of such a representative of the German minority, a native of the village of The town of Rivne District, Volyn Province, Fedor Rudolfovich Shteingel. In March 1917, he headed the Kyiv Executive Committee, and in August 1917 he was appointed by the Central Council as the General Secretary of Trade and Industry of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

After Russia's withdrawal from the First World War, in February 1918, German and Austro-Hungarian troops occupied part of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, and southern Russia. As a result, large areas of compact residence of ethnic Germans, primarily on the Right Bank, were captured. Thus, the German colonists found themselves at the epicenter of the most important military clashes of the period of the Ukrainian revolution, which had a detrimental effect on their lives and well-being.

The arrival of the occupation troops was perceived by the majority of the German population of Ukraine as salvation from the difficulties of the times of revolutionary anarchy. On March 21, 1918, the German command issued an order to return colonist lands and property captured by Ukrainian peasants. Representatives of Volyn Germans expressed their desire to continue living in Ukraine in accordance with the law on national and personal autonomy [202, ark. 25–27].

On April 29, 1918, the German and Austro-Hungarian senior leadership, dissatisfied with the policy of the Central Rada, sanctioned a coup and the establishment of the rule of hetman P. Skoropadskyi. The measures taken by the hetman to organize the internal political system of the life of the Ukrainian state were accepted by the German population with approval. A number of activists of the German ethnic minority S. Gerbel, A. Lignau and others took important positions in the state administration of P. Skoropadskyi. J. Wagner became the Minister of Labor, and F. Shteingel was the designated ambassador of the Ukrainian state in Germany. Together with other large landowners, German colonists, especially among the victims of

expropriation, took an active part in actions to eliminate the revolutionary movement in Ukrainian villages, which were carried out there by the occupying forces and hetman's armed formations. Such an action took place in the provinces of Right Bank Ukraine [203, pp. 16–17].

Since the summer of 1918, the German population on the Right Bank took steps to create their own armed self-defense. Detachments consisting of local residents were formed in almost every colony in Volyn. Significant help was provided by the command of the German and Austrian troops. A large number of rifles, several dozen machine guns, as well as ammunition and some other equipment were sent to the colony. In a number of localities, especially in Mennonite settlements, German and Austrian servicemen organized military training for young colonists. In the majority of colonies, the issues of creating and training self-defense units were dealt with by front-line colonists who had significant combat experience of the First World War [204, p. 32].

A special center - the German Committee - was created to coordinate actions. Only during the summer of 1918, several delegations were sent to Berlin to negotiate with government officials. The most active supporters of the idea of creating a German protectorate were Pastor Winkler and the former Secretary of State for Colonies F. von Lindequist. In their opinion, it was necessary to create "national-territorial autonomy" in Ukraine, Southern Russia and the Volga region, which could concentrate about 600,000 ethnic Germans. Agitation in the colonies was extremely successful. The colonists believed that the issue of including the regions of their compact residence in the new entity was a settled matter, and therefore they refused to delegate their representative to the department for the affairs of German colonists under the hetman's government [205, p. 228].

It is worth noting that the German government was in no hurry to grant German citizenship to the colonists, regardless of their ethnic origin [206, p. 193]. Therefore, from the beginning of November 1918, the process of creating colonist units accelerated, when the signs of revolutionary disintegration in the occupation troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary began to manifest themselves clearly. It was clear that

soon they would leave Ukraine, and the colonists would remain face-to-face with the radical masses of the Ukrainian peasantry, widely represented in the Kyiv region and Podillya. During this period, much attention was paid to the issue of coordinating the actions of self-defense units in the areas of compact settlement of the colonists, since the previous sad experience showed that a single unit of a separate colony is not able to oppose such numerous and well-prepared military forces of the Bolsheviks [207, p. 3–5].

On November 19, 1918, the Ukrainian government approved the rules for organizing self-defense in all German colonies of Ukraine. According to them, the general leadership of self-defense was entrusted to the Union of Colonists [204, p. 29]. In this way, the Hetmanate decided to transfer responsibility for the possible consequences of inevitable conflicts between wealthy German colonists and Bolshevik units.

Despite the active support of the German colonists of the Volunteer Army, a certain chauvinistic part of it had no sympathy for the colonists. Requisitions of food and confiscation of horses, forced labor in the colonies were often more significant in scale than in the nearby Ukrainian villages [199, p. 45].

Right-bank Germans also took part in local self-government, which manifested itself in elections to zemstvo authorities. Thus, only 36 Zemstvos were elected in the Volyn province - 6 of them were Germans. In the Kyiv provincial zemstvo, out of 60 people, all vowels, only three had German surnames. Of the 82 members of the Podilsk provincial zemstvo assembly, 9 people were Germans, and two of them were Orthodox [200, p. 258].

Thus, the German national minority of the Right Bank during the Soviet Union took a waiting position and did not participate in political events, and with the coming to power of P. Skoropadskyi and the occupation of Ukraine by German troops, the Germans revived, although they were not as active as the Jews and Poles. After the Directory came to power and the retreat of the German army, most Germans tried to return to their ethnic homeland.

The social and political life of the Czech colonists during the period of change of governments was marked, as among the Germans, by not very high activity during the period of the rule of the Ukrainian People's Republic, but by the active defense of rights during the rule of P. Skoropadskyi. Thanks to the Czechs, the then government of the Ukrainian People's Republic wanted to speed up the economic development of one of the most remote western regions. Therefore, developing at the initial stage mainly under the influence of economic factors, Czech emigration to Volhynia increased significantly as a result of support and encouragement from the government.

An important moral and political factor in the development of Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations was the fact that during the First World War, Ukraine played perhaps the most significant role in the history of the Czechoslovak national liberation movement. Since 1916, the board of the "Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia" has been meeting in Kyiv province. Congresses of its delegates were held here, the main branch of the Czechoslovak National Council (CSNC) was located here - the highest representative body of the nation, the foundations of the future Czechoslovak government, as well as the headquarters of the Czechoslovak army and its reserve battalions, which were partially staffed by Volyn Czechs [208, pp. 45–49]. The commander of the troops of the Kyiv Military District, K. Oberuchev, suggested disbanding the Czech volunteer military units, since their presence prompted Ukrainians to demand the creation of a Ukrainian army [209, p. 240].

Czech legions were also stationed near Kiev, which under Zborov inflicted a decisive defeat on the Austrian troops, capturing 62 officers, 3150 soldiers, capturing 15 cannons and many machine guns. The day of the Battle of Zborovo (June 17–18, 1917) was considered Army Day in Czechoslovakia [208, pp. 61–65].

The relocation of the CSNC branch from Petrograd to Kyiv took place in connection with the rapid spread of Bolshevik ideas, where after the proclamation of the Third Universal on November 7, 1917, all power was transferred to the Central Rada. However, even here the communist ideology received wide support among the Czech minority. Thus, in December 1917, there were about 10,000 supporters of the Czech Social Democrats in Ukraine [209, p. 250].

The Czechs in Right-Bank Ukraine received the news about the February Revolution with great enthusiasm and after the first news about this event declared their support for the revolution. Moreover, different political groups began to compete in expressing respect for the new government in Petrograd. And after the Ukrainian Central Rada was recognized by the Russian Provisional Government as a regional authority in Ukraine, the Czechs signed an agreement on the status of Czechoslovak military formations in Russia (and practically in Volyn) with the authorities not only in Petrograd, but also in Kyiv. Tomáš Masaryk (the first president of Czechoslovakia in 1918–1935) signed an agreement with the Secretary (Minister) of International Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic Oleksandr Shulgin (time in office December 1917 – January 24, 1918) on the conditions for the deployment and supply of Czechoslovak troops. The idea of self-determination of all nations, as one of the components of their political ideology, was put forward by the Czech leaders of the national movement [209, pp. 255-228].

In 1917, the political views of the Czech community in Volyn, as well as in the former Russian Empire in general, were divided into two parts. The minority supported the "democratic Czech people who were in the camps", meaning fighters for Czech statehood, regardless of their place of residence (ie including the Czech minority on the Right Bank). The majority sympathized with the views of "fans of the Russian reaction in Kyiv," that is, the board of the "Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia." But gradually during 1918–1919 the Union lost popularity. The board and all its initiatives, with the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution, lost support from both countrymen and government departments. In such a situation, they approached the third congress of the Union of Czech-Slovak Societies, which was held from April 23 to May 1 at Kyiv University named after St. Volodymyr and Commercial Institute.

The initiative in the work of the congress was taken by the Czech military and prisoners of war (from which the Czechoslovak corps was formed). Thus, the representatives from the army were represented by 141 delegates, the prisoners represented 86 representatives. The delegation of colonists was a minority – 55 members. Delegates from prisoners of war represented 335 associations, in which

22,890 Czechs and Slovaks were enrolled. There were 20 societies representing the colonists. The total number of their members was 5127 [209, p. 234].

At the end of December 1917, an agreement was concluded between the People's Republic of China and the government of the People's Republic of China, according to which the Czechoslovak army, which had previously been part of the Russian army, was subordinated to the Ukrainian army. Such agreements were dictated by the fact that the Central Rada declared a course for the continuation of the war with Austria-Hungary. Undoubtedly, such determination allowed the Czechs and Slovaks to resume their struggle against the Habsburg dynasty. The agreement also considered the option of "withdrawal of the Ukrainian People's Republic from the position of a belligerent party with the Central Powers." Under such circumstances, the Czechoslovak army was given the opportunity to leave the borders of Ukraine unhindered [209, pp. 251–252].

In 1918, the political reason for the retreat of the Czech corps from Ukraine was the danger of an attack by the Austrian army, which was based in Podilla. At the same time, a decision was made to leave Kyiv by political leaders who were members of the ChSNR - Vaclav Hirska, Yuriy Kletsanda, Prokop Maksa and others. At the end of February, the Presidium of the People's Republic of China moved to Pyryatyn. Only a few of its workers remained in Kyiv, headed by the horn player Vaclav Houska. On February 23, the evacuation of the First Division of the Czechoslovak Corps from Berdychev began. On February 24, the first skirmishes with the Germans took place near Zhytomyr. During the following days, February 28 - March 2, Kyiv silently watched as the division left the city to the sounds of Czech marches.

With the departure of the Czech corps from the territory of Right Bank Ukraine in March 1918, the active activity of Czechoslovak societies ceased until October. The number of Czechs and Slovaks has decreased significantly. Some of the soldiers returned home to Volyn. Czech political figures also left for the Czech Republic in March, and only those of them who did not approve of the course of the ChSNR or were in conflict with its active members remained in Kyiv. Vaclav Vondrak, the most famous of the Volyn Czechs, who was arrested soon after, also remained. Venceslav Shvigovsky, the editor of the only Czech newspaper published in Ukraine -

"Czechoslovak" - was also in Kyiv. He had quite friendly relations with Ukrainians [210, pp. 275–277].

Czech and Slovak politicians had reason to fear the consequences of the Brest Peace Treaty for the Czechoslovak community in Ukraine. The first repressions against Czechs and Slovaks began already in March. Entrepreneurs were the first to suffer. For example, V. Shvets, the owner of shops on Khreschatyk, was deprived of his property. His complaint was not only not considered, but also caused the businessman himself to be accused of Bolshevism. V. Shvets managed to avoid imprisonment. Dr. Vaclav Vondrak, a leading figure of the Czech social and political movement in Ukraine, was imprisoned in Lukyanivka for two months (from July 2 to the end of August). The reason for his arrest was his active participation in the organization of the Czech army of former prisoners of war. At the same time, Dr. Vondrak was lucky that the Germans did not hand him over to the Austrian authorities. After his release, he moved to Novorossiysk, where units of the Volunteer Army were being formed, which included Czechoslovak units. Czechoslovak leaders were lucky that Kyiv was subject to German, not Austrian, administration. The Germans were not very willing to hand over the former inhabitants of the Czech lands to the Austrian police. In addition, in the German commandant's office, which was located on the corner of Khreschatyk and Duma Square, the Czechs had their confidant - V. Suk, who was considered the "right hand" of Lieutenant Vachtl. In turn, an officer of Polish origin also served in German intelligence, who willingly informed the Czechs about which of them the Austrian police were looking for.

Instead, the autumn of 1918, in connection with the end of the First World War, was marked by a significant revival of the activities of foreigners in Kyiv. On September 10, the meeting of all foreign consuls resumed, during which the head of the diplomatic corps was elected the Swiss consul Gavril Enni. The previous chairman, the Greek consul Hippari, had to leave Kyiv due to misunderstandings with the local authorities [211, pp. 82–85].

The cooperative activity of the Czechs and Slovaks was revived. The Czechoslovak credit union, which did not stop its work for a whole year and existed until 1920 p.,

was joined by the Czech cooperative, which became an intermediary between peasants and entrepreneurs, and later provided support to breweries in Ukraine. At the same time, the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce was opened. The Czech Credit and Savings Union continued its activities in Zhytomyr.

The possibility of establishing a Czechoslovak consulate in Kyiv was considered by Czech officials already in the second half of October 1918. The majority of Czechs believed that Vojtech Ambrož, a former member of the Board of the Union of Czechoslovak Organizations in Russia, should be elected Czech consul. His candidacy was supported by members of the Czech National Economic Union. The opposite opinion was held in other Czech circles in Kyiv. One of them was centered around K. Klemper, who gathered around him former prisoners, young people [212, p. 85].

In 1918–1919, new military units from Czechs and Slovaks were created in Ukraine. Such an idea belonged to those Czechs who were especially close to the Russians, united around General Anton Denikin on the Don. Among the Czechs were Jan Wolff, engineers Menzl, Tozhichka, military personnel Klich and Khytil. They campaigned throughout the territory of the Right Bank for the formation of Czech military units with the aim of overthrowing the Hetmanate of Pavel Skoropadskyi. According to some data, on November 1, 1918 p. y room 24 of the hotel "Prague" they formed a secret Czech group "Union for the Liberation of Russia". During that meeting, it turned out that the old man Khytil had been sent to Kyiv from the Don in order to collect Czech volunteers for General Alekseev's army. However, during the discussion, those present still came to the conclusion that it is better to create a Czech wife in Ukraine to help the Entente, not the Russians [213, pp. 7–9].

The first order for the Dnipro Czechoslovak National Guard was given on November 17, 1918 by Captain Hrushka. Captain Vishka, who was dismissed from his post on November 27, became his assistant. The wife included 13 officers who served in various military units: in the Kuban Army, the 3rd Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment, the Austrian Army, the 7th, 42nd and 51st Siberian Rifle Regiments [213, pp. 11–12].

In general, it was in the ethnic structure of Volyn that the Czech ethnic group was formed, which led active political activity on the Right Bank. The Czechoslovak

political movement was supported, to one degree or another, by the governments of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Hetmanate, which became the basis for the formation of future close international relations between Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

So, political transformations and the struggle for power in Ukraine during 1917–1919 awakened the national consciousness not only of Ukrainians, but also of national minorities. All minorities of the Right Bank - Russians, Jews, Poles, Czechs, Germans and others - took an active part in the public movement at the national and local levels. They formed a number of parties and organizations that resolutely defended their own positions and beliefs, which often differed and conflicted with each other. However, not everyone took advantage of the Law on National Personal Autonomy, for example, the Germans. The difficult political situation caused a greater desire among the Polish, German and Czech national minorities to return to their ethnic homeland than to fight for public and national rights in Right Bank Ukraine.

6.3 Public and political activity of national minorities of the Right Bank with the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine

During the establishment of Bolshevik power, the socio-political movement of the national minorities of the Right Bank remained noticeable. However, any public activity was directly regulated and controlled by the Bolsheviks.

First of all, the activities of the departments, subdivisions, sectors, sections, bureaus of national minorities under party committees created in 1920 were noticeable. Documents and instructions on the creation of national sections and the organization of their work were regularly issued on the Right Bank. The national sections were an integral part of the subdivision of national minorities under the propaganda and agitation department of the party's regional committees. The governor's bureau was elected to lead the work of the national sections. Issues of work among national minorities were in the field of view not only of the sponge committee, but also served as a subject of discussion in centers and general meetings [214, p. 143].

Special public activity was shown by national minorities in the Bolshevik agrarian and social transformations. In the 1920s, the increase in productivity and marketability of agricultural production led to the diversification of forms and the expansion of the grassroots periphery of cooperative societies of national minorities.

The formal proclamation of the regime of promoting the development of peasant cooperation contradicted both the general goal of socialist socialization of the agrarian sphere and the command-administrative methods of managing public structures on the part of the Bolshevik state, leading to the leveling of national cooperative forms and ignoring the traditional directions of the economic life of the rural population of national minorities. The deployment of military communism in the areas where ethnic minorities live was determined by the policy of administrative pressure and state terror, the participants and hostages of which were peasant public associations [215, pp. 137–143].

Their participation in the functioning of local authorities was declared to be one of the areas of activity of peasant public associations of national minorities of Ukraine.

Accordingly, according to the data of the Central Committee of Ukraine, the policy regarding local councils carried out by class unions in areas with a compact population of national minority peasants was practically no different from the line pursued by these organizations among the Ukrainian population. Implementation of the principles of Soviet suffrage was officially entrusted to village election commissions. Formally, they represented the entire set of village public associations and were elected at the general meeting of the village. In practice, in accordance with the existing instructions, the political centers and the Committees of Poor Peasants (hereinafter referred to as the KNS) recommended only rural activists loyal to the regime to the election committees. Since the Russians of the Right Bank did not consider themselves to be national minorities, their views directly coincided with the pro-Russian public direction.

In 1920, the national communist groups within the CP(b)U took up campaigning and propaganda work with renewed vigor. The activities of the German and Czech departments took place in the following main directions: campaigning, organizational and cultural and educational work. The Communist Party of Ukraine, as reported in its

report for the second half of 1920, sent instructors to the colony who used every opportunity to organize rallies and lectures on political, economic, and cultural and educational topics. In particular, during the period of establishment of Soviet power on the Right Bank, 120 rallies, 60 women's meetings, 30 youth meetings, and 25 lectures were held. Agitation was also carried out through newspapers and other publications.

At the end of 1919 – the beginning of 1920, the CP(b)U party remained the ruling party on the Right Bank. There were also two main groups of political parties. The first group is the national-communist and pro-communist parties Ukrainian Communist Pariah (Bortbists) and Ukrainian Communist Pariah (Ukapists), as well as the Ukrainian Party of Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Borbists), the Jewish Bund (Komfarband) and others [216, pp. 54–55].

Evsektions at the party committees of the CP(b)U began working in 1919 with the aim of active propaganda of communist ideology among the Jewish population. On April 15, 1920, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U issued a resolution on the dissolution of the evsektions, replacing them with the corresponding departments under the party committees. The evsektions were accused of detachment from general party life, their independent resolution of fundamental personnel issues, and the Main Bureau of Evsektions of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U – of trying to become a "political representative of the Jewish people in Ukraine" [216, pp. 57–58]. However, this did not prevent them from actively working in the same direction. For example, in Vinnytsia, on September 4, 1921, at a meeting of the Yevsektion of the Podilsk District Committee, a decision was made to attract Jews who know their native language to enterprises where many Jews work, with the aim of preserving and spreading the Hebrew language [217, ark. 4]. And on November 27–30, 1921, on the initiative of the Evsektion, the First city-wide non-party conference of Jewish workers was held in Vinnytsia, consisting of: Zionists – 5 people; Poalei-Zionu – 4; Mensheviks – 13, representatives of the Bund, United Socialists and Esdeks also entered there; the communist faction made up the majority – 180 [218, ark. 2].

Right-wing political parties - the USDRP, the Ukrainian Socialist Workers' Party and others were forced to emigrate and operate abroad.

The second group is the organizations of the all-Russian Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. Therefore, the liquidation of multi-partyism in Ukraine was carried out in two main directions: firstly, it was the absorption of the national-communist parties and, secondly, the liquidation of the Mensheviks and SRs.

In July 1920, the Communist Party of Ukraine (b)U joined the UPLSR (fighters), which was quite numerous (at that time it numbered 7,700 people, mostly of Russian nationality) and influential among the Russian left-wing peasantry and laborers of eastern and Right-Bank Ukraine. This party actively fought against the Hetmanate, the Directory and the Denikin region. It actively cooperated with the Bolsheviks, its representatives took part in the work of the 1st – 3rd All-Ukrainian Congresses of Soviets, were part of Ukrainian Soviet governments and other authorities. Therefore, a strong left-wing current emerged in the party, which significantly exceeded the right-wing ones, and the Central Committee of the Borotists party consisted almost entirely of leftists, such as, for example, the Russians M. Algasov, M. Alekseev, V. Kaczynskii, Ye. Terletskii and others. Therefore, after joining the KP(b)U Party of the Struggle Party, they themselves decided that now "our time has come, and we need to now resolve the issue of uniting with the Bolsheviks."

The Jewish minority perceived the establishment of Bolshevik power in the 1920s as far from ambiguous. At that time, the strategy of the Bolsheviks for the eradication of religion, including Judaism, the Red Terror against the rabbis, Jewish socialist parties, and finally the introduction of military communism, which, along with the confiscation of bread from the peasants, provided for the reckless nationalization of industrial enterprises, trade and even handicrafts - all this did not create more or less favorable conditions for the normalization of the life of the Jewish community. That is why the masses of Jews, most of whom had not yet recovered from the pogroms they had experienced, sought to leave the Bolshevik-controlled part of Right Bank Ukraine as soon as possible, hoping for a better fate in emigration. During 1920–1921, about 200,000 Jews from the Kyiv, Volyn, and Podil provinces left abroad [219, pp. 136–138]. The social and political activity of the Jewish minority was suppressed and controlled. Instead, after the mass flight, at the initiative of the jewsections at the

Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Soviet government did not take urgent administrative measures to artificially narrow the emigration flow, forcibly returning to their places of previous residence those who could not prove that they had grounds for emigration officially recognized by the Soviet authorities.

The situation with conflicts between Bolsheviks and Jews was not improved by the fact that the Communist Party created in 1918 a special Jewish Commissariat (Yevkom) and a Jewish Section (Yevsektion) under the Central Committee. They were based on Jewish communists, and among the main goals of these structures and their dozens of local branches on the Right Bank was neither the representation of the Jewish population nor the alleviation of its fate. In this case, they tried to monopolize the right to political activity in the right-bank provinces, using the example of councils that monopolized the right to national politics in the name of the proletarian dictatorship [216, p. 43].

The leaders of the Evsektions considered it necessary to establish control over the adoption of any decisions concerning the Jewish population. The realization of these goals led to the actual defeat of other parties claiming to support the Jewish national minority in Right-Bank Ukraine.

By the beginning of 1921, almost all Jewish socialist parties ("United Jewish Socialists", "Bund" and "Poalei Zion") found themselves in a split, unable to withstand pressure both from the inside and from the outside - from the Communist side. Subsequently, those members of these organizations who were oriented towards the Communists joined the Communist Party and its Evsektion. Those who expressed disagreement with the authorities had a choice - either to leave political activity or to go underground [216, pp. 83–84]. Changes in national politics contributed to the growing feeling of marginalization among Jews.

June 24, 1919 in Kyiv, at the address of st. Khreshchatyk 36, sq. 3, the "Society for the Study of the History of the Jewish Labor Movement and Revolutionary Social Currents in Jewry" was formed. The presidium included: Ya. Litvak, M. Zilberfarb and M. Rafes [220, ark. 3].

In 1921, the legal political organization in Volyn, Kyiv Oblast, and Podilly remained the Jewish Communist Party "Poalei Zion" (JCP PZ), which advocated the creation of a Jewish proletarian nation through the colonization of Palestine; construction of bodies of Jewish proletarian self-government for social and cultural issues - Jewish workers' councils; creation of a single plan of Jewish communist construction; the organization of special Jewish proletarian self-defense [221, p. 124]. One of the members of Poalei-Zion, Reichman, emphasized that "this is not the time to criticize the Soviet government" and announced a party declaration in which he developed requirements for the organization of Jewish "soviets" [222, ark. 3].

Also, in the first half of the 20s, the Zionist socialist federation "Droir" ("Freedom") operated in Ukraine, which sought to unite all Jewish youth organizations into a single union of Zionist-socialist youth. Its center was located in Warsaw, and branches were created and operated in Podilsk, Volhynia, Kyiv and other provinces. She had her own newspaper called "Revolutionary Thought". The organization "Hashomer Hatzoir" was also active. It united Jewish youth aged eight to 21 and had not only a Zionist, but also a sports-scout character. In total, in the USSR in these organizations there were more than 8 thousand members of the "red" and 2-3 thousand "white and blue" Hashomer [223, p. 236].

On the other hand, it was more difficult for the Zionist political parties to defend the interests of the Jewish masses, because they acted semi-legally. The most influential Zionist associations were the Zionist Socialist Party (SSP) and the Zionist Labor Party Tseirei Zion (STP CC).

The Zionist Socialist Party was formed in 1920 as a result of the separation of some activists of the Zionist Labor Party. She recognized the class struggle, but only within the framework of parliamentarism. Like others, this party also had a secretive character, whose members, like the STP, used nicknames in their work and encrypted letters. Their printed organ was Zionist-Socialist Thought. According to the DPU, it was the most stable, active and dangerous political organization among the entire Zionist movement in Ukraine.

The Jugend organization had a special political color, which united Zionist-socialist youth and promoted socialist ideas among Jewish youth and tried to educate them in national self-awareness. She carried out work in the field of economy, in particular, she created production tools, she cooperated in this direction with the Zionist organization Gehalutz* [224, pp. 278–279].

An important element of the public life of the Jewish national minority in 1920–1921 was their self-defense organization. Self-defense units were created in all small and large towns of the Right Bank. The Soviet authorities did not like the certain independence of the Jewish self-defense units, which, moreover, were apparently financed exclusively by the Jewish bourgeoisie. According to the Communist Party, the case had to be carried out exclusively under its control [225, pp. 38–39].

Accordingly, in January 1921, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U spoke out in favor of the liquidation of public Jewish self-defense units, which were created on a national, not a class basis. The objections of even the head of the National People's Congress H. Rakovsky, who argued that the organization of self-defense with observance of all guarantees of class characteristics in the towns where pogroms had previously taken place, were absolutely necessary for the near term were not taken into account. Town communists also opposed the liquidation of Jewish units [226, ark. 225–227]. The Jewish population of the Right Bank of Ukraine, in conditions of a difficult economic situation, often united in order to preserve an established social and household situation.

In general, the Bolsheviks paid considerable attention to the social and political activities of Jews and Poles, since they constituted the majority among the minorities of the Right Bank.

For example, the newspaper "Bolshowyk" (March 1920) often provided false information about the Polish national minority. The publication emphasized the "atrocities of the Polish legionnaires": "The legionnaires committed terrible atrocities during their unsuccessful offensive. So, in one village, for the fact that 4 Red Army

* Gehalutz is an international Zionist organization created by Joseph Trumpeldorf in January 1919 with the aim of preparing Jewish youth for resettlement in Palestine.

soldiers were found, 14 villagers and found Red Army soldiers were killed. They also killed Red Army soldiers, gouging out eyes and other body parts. There were also many robberies" [227].

In another article, "Polish Communists in Volhynia," it was emphasized: "In 1920, a Polish Bureau of Propaganda and Agitation was established in Zhytomyr, which manages propaganda among the Polish people of Ukrainian villages. Communist literature is distributed, reading rooms are opened" [227].

To carry out the policy of involving the Polish population for the construction of socialism, the Soviet authorities created a party-administrative apparatus in the USSR. In April 1921, the department for national affairs under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR began to operate, and in August, the Nationalities Council under the People's Commissariat of Education of the USSR.

In 1921, the Regulations on National Sections at the Party Committees of the CP(b)U were adopted, signed by F. Kon and I. Kulik, which stated: "To conduct agitation and propaganda among workers and working national minorities, to develop and present before by the party and Soviet bodies on the issue of party and Soviet construction, within the framework of party resolutions arising from the everyday and cultural characteristics of these masses, and for the performance of special tasks, party bodies may be created under the organizations of the CP(b)U section of national minorities" [228, p. 74].

In particular, at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1921, the Polish Bureau was established, which functioned until 1931. Its members included S. Konarskyi (head), F. Matushevskyi, E. Sviontek, B. Raport, M. Sviontek, I. Lonstein. Polish bureaus operated under the provincial party committees, in particular, under Volyn and Podilsky [228, p. 77].

Polburo departments were established in small towns, in particular in Zhmeryntsi, Proskuriv, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Mogilev-Podilskyi, Novaya Ushytsia, and Letychyv. Thus, according to the report of the head of the Polburo department in Zhmerynka, H. Grigoryovych, in the summer of 1921, agitation among the Poles was carried out

successfully. And on July 20, 1921, Polish refugees organized a farewell rally and went to Poland with the slogans "Glory of the Revolution" [229, ark. 7].

Also, in November 1921, at the third conference of Polish communists in Moscow, a decision was made to send communist cadres who speak Polish to Right Bank Ukraine to carry out Soviet propaganda work among the Polish population. Secret circulars of the Polburo instructed its local units to monitor the behavior of the Polish population and report on "all counter-revolutionary manifestations in the field."

At the same time, among the Polish population of the Volyn province, a decree was forcibly imposed on the nationalization of enterprises and other real estate and their transfer to the ownership of the Radnarkhoz (Soviet national economy). Factories, workshops, warehouses, transport, hotels, shops, currency, banks, housing, etc. became the property of the state. The Revkom successfully began accounting for nationalized wealth. The AREC (All-Russian Emergency Commission) carried out its massacres on a full scale. On November 6, 1920, a Russian, the commandant of the July 1919 peasant uprising against the Bolsheviks in Novograd-Volynskyi, M. Modestov, who managed to stop the pogroms of the Jews, was shot [230, p. 285].

After the establishment of the Soviet regime, Poles who were suspected of sympathizing with and participating in the insurgent movement, during the march of Y. Pilsudskii's troops to Kyiv in 1920, in the activities of the Polish military organization, were robbed, sent to forced labor camps, subjected to repression [231, p. 75]. That is why the inhabitants of Podillia and Volhynia often turned to the Polish army for the purpose of introducing troops into their provinces. Some residents of Proskurivskyi and several other neighboring counties appealed to the Polish government to introduce the Polish Army into the territory of Podillia to protect people's lives and peace. The reason for such a request was that "Bolsheviks in Ukraine are fueling the flames of hatred for Poles, with the help of leaflets they began to slander the Entente and the Polish Army, attributing to Polish soldiers the abuse of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia occupied by the Poles, announcing retribution to the entire Polish race. The owner of the 120-mortuary estate of Buyalsky in Janov near Bazalia was killed. In Lyshuvka, not far from Kupel, the Sichovites brutally murdered a Zemstvo

citizen, Felix Minkevych. The Polish language, the Polish school, Poles-officials, in a word, everything Polish is subject to tireless persecution" [230, pp. 305–307].

Unlike the Jewish parties, the Czech and German social movements on the Right Bank had their own difficulties. Jews mainly lived in cities and towns and were more active in public life than other national minorities, who were mostly rural dwellers. The territory of residence of different ethnic groups had a considerable influence on the nature of their public positions [232, p. 19].

In the national German and Czech villages, there were traditional organizations that had a religious color and functioned exclusively within the territorial boundaries of a separate settlement and did not have any centralized management. German youth hardly took part in public life, no party, Komsomol or pioneer organizations were active, but 9 national newspapers were published in the three provinces of the Right Bank. Two conservative religious organizations were also discovered – "Marienkinder" and "Ordensweiber" [233, p. 186]. The first organization included girls of different social status: daughters of poor people and wealthy peasants. According to the statute, they were forbidden to go to parties, theater performances, and meet boys before marriage. In another organization, "Ordensweiber" (Order of Franciscan monks), it was necessary to strictly adhere to the canons of the Catholic faith, to spend free time in fasting and prayer.

Among the Czech public organizations in Volyn were the fire brigade (Ochotnicza Straż Pożarna), "Sokół", the Agricultural Society (Towarzystwo Rolnicze) and others. It was with their assistance that the Czechs published their own magazines. The "Czechoslovak People's Association" (ČNO), "Czech Mother School" (ЧМШ) also expanded their activities [234, p. 55]. The main idea of public organizations was to maintain economic and cultural ties between representatives of the Czech national community in Volyn. Such organizations were recognized by the Soviet leadership as hostile, consisting of the Kurkul-clerical element and having no right to exist.

Despite everything, the Czech ethnic minority continued to maintain cultural ties on the Right Bank. On August 1, 1921, on the initiative of the Czechoslovak branch of the Volyn Provincial Committee (Bolsheviks), the First Congress of Czech Colonists

of Volyn was convened. The congress was held in the Peasant House in Zhytomyr. The delegates were representatives from villages (1 delegate from 200 residents) and members of the Committee of the Poor. Komnezam members were the most active group, but among the speakers there were also several representatives of the intelligentsia.

Most of the Czech colonists of Right Bank Ukraine did not support the new Bolshevik government. This is proven by numerous reports of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Group. For example, in a message dated June 24, 1919, it is stated that the colony of "Czech Smiles" is absolutely opposed to the Soviet government. It is also stated that most of the "bourgeois elements" who did not leave for the Czech Republic remained in Kroshno and Zhytomyr [235, ark. 2–6].

Thus, with the arrival of the Bolsheviks in the political arena of Right Bank Ukraine, Russian and Jewish public organizations continued their activities, partially or completely merging with the Communist Party. The activity of the public movement of Poles has significantly decreased due to emigration and the hostile policy of the Soviet authorities. The Germans and Czechs, who did not willingly participate in the revolutionary race since 1917, and those who could not leave Ukraine, almost stopped social activities and limited themselves to solving problems of an exclusively local nature.

Conclusions:

1. The socio-political position of the Jews was primarily determined by the problem of the "settlement strip" and the active participation of the Jews in the revolutionary movement. On the eve of the Ukrainian revolution, Jewish parties set themselves the goal of guaranteeing the rights of national minorities, recognizing minorities' right to national and personal autonomy. In 1915, the Jewish Committee for Aid to the Victims of War (ECJV), the Society of Handicrafts (TRP) was established.

2. On the eve of the Ukrainian revolution, the socio-political movement of Poles was relatively active. Taking advantage of certain concessions, Polish communities created the "Polish House" in Lutsk (1906), the "Brotherly Help" society in Uman

(1906), dozens of Roman Catholic circles. However, after the First World War, the authorities treated with suspicion and mistrust the vast majority of the national minorities of the Right Bank, including the Polish population, resorting to brutal persecution and repression, accusing them of anti-Russian and separatist sentiments.

3. The German ethnic minority of Right Bank Ukraine did not participate in public and political activities until 1917. Instead, the Germans paid attention to their self-government. The internal organization of the German colonists in Ukraine was characterized by broad democracy (election of a manager, teacher, and priest).

4. The social and political views of the Czechs on the Right Bank were determined by their cooperation with the tsarist government. In particular, since 1916, the meeting of the board of the "Union of Czechoslovak Societies in Russia" has been held. Congresses of its delegates were held here, the main branch (branch) of the Czechoslovak National Council was located here – the highest representative body of the nation, the foundation of the future Czechoslovak government, as well as the headquarters of the Czechoslovak army and its reserve battalions. All of them were created with the aim of countering Habsburg Austria-Hungary.

The activities of the Czech People's Council on the territory of the Right Bank were aimed, first of all, at communication with locals and local groups abroad, as well as theoretical and practical solutions to the problems of immigrants. Czech schools were mostly established at the churches of the Right Bank. The network of folk schools in Czech settlements was quite dense, there were reading rooms and libraries. Until 1917, the Czechs maintained schools at their own expense and taught in their native language using foreign textbooks. Subsequently, these national schools were subordinated to the Ministry of Public Education.

5. Jews and Poles were the most active in the social and political movement of the Right Bank during the Ukrainian Revolution. In the Central Rada there were more than 15% Jewish and 20% Polish representatives. The Jewish parties – the Bund, the EUDRP, the Zionists, the OESRP, the Jewish Democratic Association and Polish associations – the Polish Circle, the Socialist Polish Party supported Ukraine's aspirations for autonomy, but primarily took into account their own territorial and

national interests. All national minorities of Right-Bank Ukraine during the Ukrainian Revolution took an active part in local self-government.

The change of governments in Ukraine during 1917–1919 did not weaken the political activity of the national minorities of the Right Bank. The officially canceled national freedoms did not prevent the national minorities of the Right Bank from taking an active part in the public and political life of Ukraine. Russians, Poles, Germans, and Jews held government positions during the Hetmanate along with Ukrainians.

The UNR Directory restored the abolished national freedoms and the law on national-personal autonomy of national minorities, but was unable to guarantee them. A series of Jewish pogroms swept through Right-Bank Ukraine, Polish estates were looted. Substantial damage was caused by the Bolshevik and Denikin occupiers. This led to the weakening of the social movement of the majority of national minorities of the Right Bank and caused a desire among them to leave for their ethnic homeland. Only Jewish parties and public organizations continued their active activities.

6. Starting from the second half of 1920, political parties and public figures of ethnic minorities on the Right Bank were forced to adjust their political programs and adapt to the new socio-political conditions caused by the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine. Despite some belonging to the Bolshevik movement of Jews and Poles, the elections to the Soviets were carried out by the methods of harsh pressure of the new regime and were conducted in the interests of the state. Manifestations of free political thought and the creation of new parties were prohibited on the basis of an extensive party and repressive apparatus, particularly in the right-bank provinces. The most effective Jewish parties and organizations during the period of the establishment of Soviet power were the Zionist Socialist Party, the Zionist Labor Party "Zeirei Zion", Jewsection, "United Jewish Socialists", "Comferband", "Bund" and the Jewish Communist the "Poalei Zion" party, formed in August 1919. Some of them, such as the Bund, self-liquidated as early as 1921. Starting in 1919, Polish, German, and Czech organizations were forced to adapt to difficult conditions of existence, and Russian ones merged with the dominant Bolshevik by movement.