

SECTION 4. LINGUISTICS

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4.1 Conceptual opposition in the ethical "conceptosphere"

At the center of any national concept sphere, defined as a set of nationally marked mental units of linguistic culture, ordered according to the principle of systemicity, plurality, integrity, connection and structuredness [See. 131, 135, 136 and others], are ethical concepts and representations, united in the conceptual system *Moral (Moral Conceptual System)*. The relationships that develop between the components that make up this system unite them into various substructures - a kind of conceptual associations. Those conceptual associations in which opposition relations prevail represent oppositions, among which the antinomy of *Morality/Immorality* dominates, which has specific content and structural features of the language embodiment in the English linguoculture.

The main goal set in our study is to clarify the characteristics of the conceptual opposition *Morality/Immorality* as a referent area of the language of ethics (naive ethics), its boundaries and linguistic properties. The choice of linguistic/speech material depends on the result obtained, on the basis of which it is possible to draw conclusions about the nature of the relationship between these two concepts in the English conceptual picture of the world. In our article, the *Moral Conceptual System* is described in terms of those characteristics that have been identified in the framework of theoretical ethics, cultural studies, general philological studies and modern philosophy of language. In relation to the model built in our work, these are the guidelines from which one can start when describing the actual language/speech matter, in other words, this is a deductive model of morality, which we explore by inductively describing language/speech.

The concepts of *morality* and *immorality* are related to the value concepts of different cultures, simultaneously acting as both national-specific knowledge systems and universal "key cultural concepts". The presence of universal value components in

the semantic structure of the phenomena under consideration provides a unified system of principles of behavior for any person of any nationality in any cultural community. At the same time, national-original features, identified in cultural concepts, in the form of constants deeply rooted in the language and culture of an individual people, allow us to represent these phenomena in the form of national-specific conceptual paradigms, each of the chains of which is verbalized by a lexeme in the corresponding language: *morality* - *Moral* - *morale* – *мораль*.

Each language has a corpus of words denoting cultural realities and therefore do not have full semantic equivalents in other languages. So, no one doubts the “untranslatability” of the nominations of *origami*, *karate*, *ikebana*, *samurai*, *bonsai*, which are associated with Japan; *gondola*, *doge*, *spaghetti*, *pizza* as specific Italian phenomena; *torero*, *bullfighting*, *flamenco*, *paella* - Spanish culturally significant images - into other languages, because they act as a kind of "signs" of traditional national culture (all these lexical units represent exotic concepts). Of course, there is an "untranslatability" of such words as *vulgarité* - in French, *freedom* - in English, *Angst* - in German, *miai* - in Japanese. From our point of view, the words *morality* and *immorality* also have a similar "untranslatability". They cannot be semantically identical: if we take into account the cultural realities behind these words, i.e. the history, lifestyle, value system, etc. of a particular people, as well as the peculiarities of speech use "identical in sense" lexical units in individual languages, it turns out that the meanings that are considered to be coinciding are far from being close.

The concepts of *morality* and *immorality*, verbalized in the English language by the corresponding lexemes, are value concepts of English culture, which are characterized by a set of both universal and original, culturally determined, semantic features.

It should immediately be noted that the concept of *morality* is coreferential to the concept of "naive ethics", used in linguistic descriptions along with such designations as "naive anatomy", "naive philosophy", etc. [130]. The internal form of the term "naive ethics" indicates the sphere of everyday life, including ordinary *moral consciousness*. It would be more accurate to speak of naive morality, since ethics,

according to the generally accepted interpretation of the term, is a theory of morality. However, it is the term naive ethics that is quite convenient as a designation of a fragment of the actual linguistic (naive) picture of the world as a linguistic image of the real world, reflecting the conceptual picture. Whereas the core part of the conceptual picture, as already mentioned, is morality, that is, the basic part of the human psyche (the ideal sphere), and various situations of human relationships with other people and society (the social sphere). It is essential, however, that in any situation morality does not manifest itself directly, “does not lie on the surface”: the reflecting individual extracts it from this or that state of affairs. The basis and at the same time the instrument of this operation is the same moral consciousness of the individual. Nevertheless, the language of morality is referentially addressed to both the “world of ideas” and the “world of people”, and various human actions that receive a moral qualification are accordingly involved in the semantic field of the conceptual association *Morality/Immorality*.

Both in theoretical concepts and in a naive picture of the world, *Morality* and *Immorality* are concepts with fuzzy boundaries: “To define morality ... means to delimit moral approval from any other, that is, to indicate the criterion of a specifically moral modality” (our emphasis is N. K.) [132]. In our opinion, there is no single criterion. We assume that the sphere of morality is marked in language, the analysis of which will help to clarify the required criteria. In the meantime, let us construct a model of moral consciousness, based on the provisions of theoretical ethics, since the latter, although with reservations, is considered as “the highest, developed layer of moral (moral – N.K.) consciousness” [126, 146].

The dichotomous opposition of *Morality* and *Immorality*, which underlies the primary categorization of moral consciousness, appears in classical ethical concepts as the opposition of *value* and *antivalue*, *norm (standard)* and *antinorm*, as well as opposition of personified objects of *approval* (approval) or *disapproval* (*condemnation*): based on their ideas of good and evil, a person evaluates another person. This list are nominations of the fundamental categories of two eternally competing subsystems - the moral one, which implies the observance of universal

human social principles and norms, and the immoral one, characterized by their neglect (see about this: [127, p. 316 - 320]).

In the philosophical tradition, there is an idea of a two-level structure of morality: “on the one hand, it is a relatively independent realm of moral consciousness” [126, 140] - *Morality*, and on the other hand - the "world of moral relations", or the same thing as moral practice, the idea of standards of behavior [134, 127, 142] - *Morals*. The distinction between “forms of consciousness” and “rules of behavior” is also found in linguistic studies of ethics [128, 131], which is quite consistent with the idea of the conceptual opposition under consideration, verbalized in the English linguoculture by two lexical oppositions *Morality/Immorality* and *Morals/Amorality*.

In the definition of the concept of "opposition" we share the point of view on it as a union of two different objects, "connected ... in such a way that thought cannot represent one of them without presenting the other" [133, p. 136]. The unity of opposition terms is always formed with the help of a concept that “implicitly contains both counterterms and decomposes into an explicit opposition when it refers to a specific reality” [133, p. 136] and when there is a “relationship between two units that are characterized by a common *integral* (emphasis ours – N.K.) sign and to distinguish which one distinction is enough” [123, p. 188]. Possible relations between members of the opposition are classified as relations of identity, inclusion, intersection or exclusion [133, p. 203]. Thus, the presence in the structure of two concepts of general and differential characteristics gives reason to single them out as an opposition. Conceptual oppositions are such associations of concepts that are built on the antonymy of the most general and particular meaningful features and means of their expression (with the obligatory presence of a common semantic integral component), for example: “*Friend – Foe*”, “*Life - Death*”, “*Light - Darkness*”, “*Truth - Falsehood*”, etc. It is essential that all these categories are inherent in moral consciousness and are objectified in the English version of the language of ethics.

Linguistic analysis of value oppositional concepts *Morality/Immorality* should take into account the nature of their linguoculturological opposition and detailing the semantic characteristics of thematic names that verbalize the phenomena under

consideration.

Morality is defined by us as "a specific type of regulation of people's relations, aimed at their humanization, a set of norms of behavior, communication and relationships accepted in a particular social organism" [129, p. 647]. The concepts of morality and moral consciousness (morality) are not always clearly distinguished. Moral consciousness (the sphere of the "world of ideas") we consider as part of the human mentality - a single conceptual system *Moral conceptual system*.

The Latin root of the lexeme *moral* - *mos-* / *mor-* (*custom*, pl. *mores* - *manners*, *character*) has been preserved in all Indo-European languages, which confirms at least a partial commonality of the concept of *Moral* in the respective cultures, the source of which was or the formation of which in many respects influenced by the ancient era with its languages, its philosophy and value system. In Roman law and philosophy, and at the same time in the language, the *idea* of morality and the *word* denoting it as a derivative of the noun *mōs*, ((*custom*, *habit*, *custom*); pl. *mōris* (*mores*, *character*, *way of life*, *behavior*, *law*, *rule*, *prescription*)) - the adjective *mōrālis*, which was used by Cicero to translate the Greek word "*ethical*" ("*ēthos*" - *ἦθος*) and later began to be used by other authors of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages [144]. Being the next of a diachronic derivational chain, it was the adjective *mōrālis* that was borrowed by the Old French language, and already from French *morale moral* appeared in English and was recorded in historical monuments, including in the texts of Chaucer, the creator of literary English, initiating the use of the English lexeme *moral* (*adjective, concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior* [137]). As a noun, this lexeme is used in correlation with the concept *Moral* only in the plural form and is translated into Russian as *mores*; *morality*; *moral foundations* [Longman], and in the singular form - with a meaning located on the periphery of the corresponding lexico-semantic field *Morality*: a lesson about right or wrong that can be learned from a story or experience [137].

The lexeme *morality* is not a direct derivative of the English word *moral* - its penetration into the lexical system of the English language took place in parallel. From the adjective *mōrālis*, the noun *mōrālitās* is formed in Late Latin, which passed into


Old French in the form of *moralité*, and from French, in turn, already settled in English in its final form *morality*. The lexeme *morality* by the late Middle English period (1449) was used with several meanings at once: as a science (this meaning is fixed exclusively in Middle English) and as moral qualities, moral discourse, moral instructions, moral principles and rules (1680) [141]. The modern context for the interpretation of the lexeme *morality* is already found in Shakespeare's works "As You Like It", "Measure for Measure". The word *morality* came into wide use only in the first half of the 19th century [144], although, according to the data of historical documents and literary monuments, the use of words with such a root in English culture took place simultaneously with the formation of the literary language. An analysis of the use of the studied lexeme allows us to assert that at least by the 19th century it had three leading substantive features that have survived to this day: ***principles (standards)***, ***conduct (behavior)*** and the opposition ***right/wrong (good/bad)*** [143].

In modern English, these semes are included in the intension of the definition of the first lexico-semantic variant (LSV) of *morality*. Summarizing the lexicographic definitions of *morality* selected from English explanatory dictionaries and identifying the constant features present in all definitions, the core of the lexical meaning of *morality* can be represented as: *principles or standards of conduct (behavior), based on right and wrong*.

The semes *conduct (behavior)* and *principles or standards* act as archisemes of the lexemes *morals* and *morality*, as well as their derivatives: *morale* - *moral state*; *moralization* - *moralizing*; *moralism* - *moral teaching*; *amoralism* - *immoralism, the denial of all morality*; *immorality* - *immorality*; *immorality* - *immorality*. This provision confirms the idea of theoretical ethics, in which the system of morality in its generally accepted understanding is a specific way of perceiving and understanding reality, a set of attitudes, a manner of feeling and thinking, while in the latter case, the objects of "specific perception and understanding" are always human behavior and its compliance with the norm [124, 125, 129, 140].

The lexico-semantic macrofield *Moral conceptual system*, corresponding to the conceptual system of the same name, within which, as already indicated, a binary

opposition is formed and whose poles are represented by the concepts, can be represented graphically:



LSV *morality*, not included in the opposition, is defined as 1. *a system or sphere of moral conduct*; 2. *a particular system of values* [137], i.e., a set of patterns; something that meets the requirements of morality; moral. In The New Penguin English Dictionary [139], *Christian morality* is a good illustration of such a system. In this sense, the word *morality* has no antonym.

The first counterterm in the opposition *morals/amorality* is described as a set of standards of behavior (*standards of behavior, or principles of right and wrong* [Oxford]; *standards of behavior* [139]), and, accordingly, its antonym, disregard for such standards, is *Amorality* (a derivative of the adjective *amoral*, interpreted in academic lexicographic practice as "*without morals*" [137]).

LSV *Morality* in opposition to *morality/immorality* is described through the universal axiological categories of culture of a moral and ethical order – "*right*" and "*wrong*" [137, 139]: *principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior* [137]. In turn, *immorality*, being the lexical antonym of *morality*, forms a privative opposition with it, excluding the seme "*right*" and keeping "*wrong*".

The opposition of the invariant signs "*right*" and "*wrong*" is a differential seme in the definitions of the nominations of this binary opposition within the lexico-semantic macrofield of the *Moral conceptual system*. In turn, "*right*" and "*wrong*" are hypernyms of particular antonymically related concepts - "*virtues*" - "*vices*", "*honour*" - "*dishonour*", "*honesty*" - "*dishonesty*", "*modesty*" - "*pride*", etc.

Thus, the national and cultural originality of any moral and ethical concept sphere consists in the specificity of the set of its value dominants, the features of their structure and hierarchy, and can be identified through the analysis of the facts of linguistic objectification of concepts. The linguistic representation of the conceptual opposition *Morality/Immorality* is the most important structural component of naive ethics. The conceptual system of *Morality* is based on the idea of *a set of norms of behavior (standards)*, a system of rules adopted in society and to some extent shared by its representatives. Morality is a conceptual subsystem verbalized in English by the lexical oppositions *morals/amorality* and *morality/immorality*.

In the future, the task of our research is to describe the principles of verbalization of the moral qualities of a person in relation to this problem, which are concretized in the following main areas of scientific research: the linguistic image of a moral/immoral person as part of the image of the “inner person” in a naive ethical picture of the world.